Wednesday, August 4, 2010
POST 0017
August 04, 2010
9:19 p.m. Manila Time
AS THE SUPREMO* OF THIS MY BLOG:) I have decided to insert these four (4) writings RE BANGSAMORO before continuing my usual antique antics. These are EXTREMELY IMPORTANT for the HISTORY OF THIS COUNTRY & should be read by everyone, FOREIGNERS, FILIPINOS, INDIOS, MOROS, etcetc. The ABBAS BROTHERS were a pair of VERY BRIGHT MORO LEADERS from a mixed M'RANAW-TAUSUG ancestry. In this first article, the author holds firmly to the conviction that his brother was MURDERED. ABBAS also relates important details RE NINOY AQUINO... This point-of-view from the MUSLIM MOROS is what I have termed the "BANGSAMORO PERSPECTIVE" on PHILIPPINE HISTORY.
-------START OF COPIED ABBAS ARTICLE-------
March 27, 2007
WAR IN MORO LAND (Last Phase) by Jun Abbas | History, Socio-
Political, Bangsa Moro, Moroland, Religious/Cultural
jamalashley @ 3:07 am
March 31 is the birth anniversary of Macapanton Rashid Yahya Abbas, Jr., my eldest brother. Among our siblings, I was probably the one closest to him during the years 1977-91. We were together in Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1983 and again in 1985. We were also briefly together in Paris, France. I also helped him put up an office in Kuala Lumpur in 1985. When he came back to the Philippines, he set up the SSB Holdings, Inc. SSB was practically a 2-man job. In his unsuccessful bid for the Philippine Senate in1992, I was his Campaign Chief of Staff. After the elections, our paths drifted apart. He concentrated more in Mindanao. The last 10 years of his life centered on his wife and children in Lanao and Metro Manila.
On 17 September 2003, Jun Abbas was, as far as I am concerned, murdered at the Makati Medical Center.
Returning from Mindanao after speaking and other official engagements, Jun proceeded to Makati Medical Center for an executive check-up. He was administered a massive dose of dextrose “3 bottles within three hours“ supposedly to lower his sugar count
and to counter his alleged dehydration. While the third bottle was filling his body organs with liquid, he coughed; and, later, he was gasping for breath. His wife, daughters and sister desperately called for a doctor but nobody came. They implored the nurses to call any doctor. Incredibly, NOT A SINGLE DOCTOR WAS AVAILABLE at
the supposedly top-notch Makati Medical Center. Yet when it was all over for Jun, the doctors suddenly came rushing from nowhere.
When I later told my doctor-friends about it, they all said that Jun died of DROWNING. Nobody could survive such a massive dose of dextrose in so short a time.
A few weeks before this happened; Jun led a top-level Moro delegation to meet with President GMA. The Moros, which included almost all elected and appointed top government officials, demanded the ouster of a top Cabinet official, whom the Moros accused as responsible for escalating the war in Mindanao. GMA agreed and sacked the official.
After Jun's passing away, that top official was back at the Cabinet.
For years, I had been telling him to write his memoirs on the Bangsa Moro revolution if he wanted history to recognize his central role in it. There are already many versions floating around.
Amazingly, just before he died, he submitted to Ateneo a long and rambling essay where he mentioned his role in the revolutionary movement. The Ateneo Law Journal editors must have realized the importance of such a document. They had it published immediately, including all the grammatical errors.
Jun Abbas's last published article was
IS A BANGSA MORO STATE WITHIN A FEDERATION THE SOLUTION?
(Ateneo Law Journal Vol. 48 Sept 2003)
(Macapanton Rashid Yahya Abbas, Jr, was Full Professor at the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in the mid to late 1970s)
Here is an excerpt from that article:
===========================
WAR IN MORO LAND (Last Phase)
The brief history of the present Bangsa Moro Struggle, which I will present in the first person because I was one of the original members of the movement from 1965 onward. This is perhaps the first time I will be writing on this matter because I want the Bangsa Moro Youth and the Filipino People to understand the Islamic Struggle of our people while there are still some of the originators of the struggle who are still alive and involved in different capacities in the society.
Even before the Jabidah Massacre in 1968, the Muslim students organized on the national level, the CNI Scholars Association and the Muslim Students Association of the Philippines which started as social organizations. In 1965, because of the Vietnam War and massive influx of settlers to Mindanao, the student leaders from UP
injected these issues and started the militancy of the Muslim students. The first issue to be questioned was the policy of "National Integration"" because the Muslims believe that they can not be integrated culturally and socially to the Philippine society that is based on Christian values and acceptance, of Spanish colonialism as a blessing and heritage that resulted to the Christianization of the Philippines. The scholars and the Commission on National Integration supported this position and what the country needed was "unity in diversity" and possibly a "federal system of government" since amendments to the constitution was on the national agenda for 1971.
The Muslim Youth organized that National Coordinating Council for Islamic Affairs (NACCIA) and issued a Manifesto entitled "Al Wahid" in 1967 calling on the Filipino leadership to pay greater attention to the miserable situation of the Muslims before
rebellion will break out. There was a massive influx of settlers to the Muslim areas and displacement of Muslims and Lumads was widespread. The government was encouraging the immigration of settlers from Visayas especially from Negros provinces, Leyte, Samar, and Iloilo, because of the problems of the sugar plantation
workers. There were also massive logging activities denuding the Mindanao forests by concessionaires from Luzon like the Antoninos, Sarmientos, Valencias, Floreindos, Alcantaras, etc.. These new economic elite who were the agents of Korean, Japanese, US and European companies destroyed the forests of Mindanao which were preserved because of the failure to colonize the Bangsa Moro.
These groups that destroyed the environment are now the industrial and financial controllers of the region including installing their proteges in the political positions and even dictate policies for the Bangsa Moro. The NACCIA warned that these economic aggressions against the Muslims in their homeland and political displacement will be met with armed struggle. The government did not listen as usual.
In 1968, trainees from Sulu (Sulu and Tawi-tawi was one province then) in the Army were massacred by their officers at Corregidor when they demanded their pay and to return to their homes because they refused to go Sabah to infiltrate and start the rebellion to reclaim Sabah for the Philippines. The Commanding Officer was Major
Eddie Martelino, an alleged convert to Islam (who was later executed by the MNLF-Malaysians in Sabah after his capture sometime in 1978-79). This incident led Congressmen Rashid Lucman, Salipada Pendatun and Salih Ututalum to demand congressional investigations backed by massive youth demonstrations which took over the Congress premises. Only Congressmen Indanan Ani and Ali Dimaporo sided with
President Marcos.
The Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations composed of all the National Muslim organizations under the leadership of Sultan Rashid Lucman was organized. I was elected Secretary General. My assignment was to organize the demonstrations. I organized and led the demonstrations in front of Congress while Nur Misuari and Abul
Alonto organized the sit-in at Freedom Park, Malacanang. I led the demonstration in Jolo the first and last anti-government demonstration of around 10,000 persons and in Cotabato City with the MIM and Marawi City with the BMLF leaders. I was then Private Secretary to Commissioner Tamano at CNI, so, I filed my resignation which was not accepted, but I was allowed to go on leave of absence by Executive Secretary Rafael Salas because I refused to desist from leading the demonstrations. I told him, "if Ilonggo soldiers were massacred, would you keep silent because you are in
government?" He smiled and told me that he will inform President Marcos, and they will not take any action against me. Despite my action, my brother-in-law was taken as the Muslim Senatorial candidate. Maybe Marcos would have dealt with the Muslims properly if only Martial Law was not declared. In that election, only Congressman Pendatun was returned to Congress because of massive fraud and vote buying which defeated the anti-Marcos Congressmen but a Muslim senator was elected in the person of Senator Mamintal Tamano.
The foreign trained Top 90 has returned home and were welcomed by Senator Ninoy Aquino at Malabang, Lanao Sur. The local training camps were established and the Top 90 became the trainors. At that time, the secret organization was the Bangsa Moro Liberation Front (BMLF) which was later named Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
(BMLO) under Sultan Rashid Lucman and General Salipada Pendatun.
The Top 90 also secretly organized the Moro National Liberation Front headed by Nur Misuari and Abul Alonto. The young Ulama, professionals and youth leaders were with the BMLF. This was also the first time that Bangsa Moro was used to refer to the Muslims in the Philippines. The MNLF used Moro only. This came after the Muslim Youth National Assembly (MYNA) wherein, over 200 youth leaders met in Zamboanga City at the same time with the Muslim Association of the Philippines Congress in 1969. Almost all the future leaders of the MNLF, MILF, BMLO and political leaders of the
Muslims were present.
The MYNA debated independence or federation as the exercise of the right of self-determination of the Bangsa Moro people. After two days, the vote that won was to participate in the Constitutional Convention election of 1971 and proposed a Federal system to get a Bangsa Moro state. That is why, Nur Misuari, Mike Mastura, Musib Buat, Hussin Pangato of MIM, others and myself ran in the Concon elections and only Mike Mastura was able to make it due to massive cheating and vote buying to assure Marcos a majority. The Federal proposal never saw the light of day in the Concon and the Constitution of 1973 did not contain any provision to respect Bangsa Moro right of self-determination. Only Delegate Banjamin Abubakar of Sulu refused to vote for the approval of the Constitution and he truly represented the aspirations of the Bangsa Moro people and not the Muslim delegates who capitulated to Marcos.[1]
The 1970-72 period saw the escalation of violence between the Barracudas and Ilagas in Lanao Norte and Black shirts and Ilagas in the Cotabato massacres. The Ilagas “rats†were paramilitary forces of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and supported by the AFP directly or indirectly. The Mindanao Independence Movement was organized by Datu Udtog Matalam, patriarch of Cotabato, in 1969 which led to the violent clashes and became the stimulus for the government and Christian militias to launch massacres against unarmed Muslims as in the Manile, Cotabato massacre of Muslims in a Masjid (mosque); the Lutayan; the Tacub; the IPIL and the Pata, Sulu massacres etc. The people of Buldon fought a battle against the AFP wherein the air force, artillery and tanks were used against a Moro town. They fought until Mayor Tomatic Aratuc met with President Marcos and the government forces were withdrawn.
That time the President was the real Commander-in-Chief and was responsible for all the military assaults on the Moro Communities. This situation continued and the BMLF under Sultan Lucman and General Pendatun decided to file genocide charges against President Marcos at the UN and also at the OIC. A Petition was filed with UN Commission on Human Rights, through the UN Office in Manila in 1971. This was reported on the BBC world radio and was heard by Col. Ghadaffi of Libya who was then the new leader of his country and decided to respond. He sent his Foreign Minister Saleh Buoyaser to Manila as a Professor to attend the World Universities Conference. That was how the Bangsa Moro case was internationalized. This led to the organization of the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) where all the Muslim political leaders joined as well the youth leaders including the writer,
Misuari and Salamat. Dean Ceasar Adib Majul was elected Chair as non-partisan leader and this author Secretary General.
OIC RECOGNITION
As mentioned earlier, this author was sent as a lawyer to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in February 1972 at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of the OIC. He met with Secretary General Tengku Abdul Rahman and asked King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz to mention the issue in his speech. King Faisal also called Tun Abdul Razak to support the case, which Malaysia did. Minister Buoyaser of Libya coordinated with the Moros and got the Bangsa Moro issue into the agenda for the next conference in Libya. That was how the Bangsa Moro issue became the concern of the OIC from 1972 to the present, 29 years and still not finally settled. When martial law was declared, the
author was arrested and detained at Fort Bonifacio. In 1976, he went into exile in Saudi Arabia until 1987, after EDSA I upon invitation of the government under President Corazon C. Aquino. In 1972, the Bangsa Moro clans led the fight against the military that were sent to the Moro areas to collect loose firearms which started with the October uprising in Marawi in 1972. Later in 1973, the MNLF gradually took over the leadership of the armed struggle because of the weapons they were able to bring into Mindanao and logistics donated by supporters of the Bangsa Moro JIHAD. The OIC and many Islamic organizations and governments gave political and material support to the Bangsa Moro. The OIC Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Somalia and Senegal came to the Philippines in 1973 and met with the President and agreed to work out a political solution. They went to the Muslim areas up to Sulu. In 1974, the burning of Jolo resulted when the MNLF fighters entered Jolo and a very big battle raged with naval bombardment ordered against Jolo in disregard for innocent civilian lives.
As a consequence, the 1974 Islamic Summit was held in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Summit declared that the situation of the Bangsa Moro Muslims was not an internal problem but a concern of the whole Muslim world. This was demanded by the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The Bangsa Moro was allowed to convene in Marawi City by President Marcos. The Confederation of the Royal Houses of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan led by its Chairman, Sultan Harun Al Rashid Lucman and this author as the Supervising Officer of the Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao, held the "Mindanao Policy Conference" and came out with a resolution demanding regional political autonomy. This was at the height of martial law and it became the political basis for the OIC to demand regional political autonomy and the demand for negotiations with the Bangsa Moro leaders and the MNLF at the 1974 Kuala Lumpur Conference of OIC-ICFM. At this time there was only one leadership and organization – the MNLF. The Bangsa Moro struggle got the support of the Muslim states and the first negotiation between MNLF and GRP was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia hosted by the OIC in 1975. Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor led the GRP delegation.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH BANGSA MORO
In 1976, the government created a negotiating panel headed by Carmelo Z. Barbero to talk peace again with the MNLF. The talks were held under the auspices of the OIC in Tripoli, Libya. The peace talks resulted in the forging of the now historic Tripoli
Agreement and recognized as the historic territories of the Bangsa Moro Darul Salam of the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, Pat-a Pagampong a Ranao, Rajah Buayan and Saragani or the areas almost corresponding to the Moro Province during the American occupation which is the whole of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan except the Caraga Region. To end the war, the areas of autonomy consisting of 13 provinces and cities therein were recognized by the GRP as the Bangsa Moro Homeland. These are the areas which were later constituted as the SZOPAD - Special Zone of Peace and Development.
President Marcos held a referendum on the areas of autonomy and reduced the area to 10 provinces and cities and established the Regional Commissions for Regions 9 and 12. The violation of the Tripoli Agreement was from its inception and it was more honored in the breach rather in compliance. In 1977, Hashim Salamat, the MNLF Vice Chairman for Foreign Affairs left the organization and formed as separate faction of the MNLF. After a few years when OIC did not recognize him, Salamat organized the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), emphasizing Islam instead of only political and economic grievance of the Bangsa Moro.
This split was later followed in 1982 when the Moro Peoples National Congress of MNLF led by Atty. Abdul Basit Harrid (Jibril Riddah) and Haji Napis Bidin ousted Chairman Nur Misuari and installed Commander Dimas Pundato as Chairman, supported by many active commanders in the Homeland. Pundato was then Vice-Chairman of Misuari's MNLF. The BMLO and the Pundato faction later joined forces and established the MNLF-Reformist Group. The group disbanded when Pundato joined the government as OMA Chief under President Corazon Aquino. The reformist commanders who did not join the government like Cdr. Digo and Cdr. Iqra formed in 1999, the new MNLF-Islamic Command Council with Mujahab Hashim as Chairman and Cdr. Milham Alam as Chief of Staff. Eventually, the four MNLF factions reunited and approved a constitution in Tripoli, Libya, April 2003. They have not yet elected a Chairman and other officers.
TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 1976
The government implemented the Tripoli Agreement unilaterally in a manner that was in contravention with the letter and spirit of the said Agreement. In 1986, President Marcos was deposed through "People Power" and Corazon C. Aquino ascended to the Presidency. She did not honor fully the Tripoli Agreement according to MNLF,
the only pact, treaty or agreement signed during the Marcos regime that Aquino refused to recognize despite the commitment of Ninoy Aquino, to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement and if autonomy would not work after ten years, he will support the independence of Bangsa Moro. This author was present when this statement was made in 1982 because Sultan Rashid Lucman, General Salipada Pendatun and this author met with King Khalid Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia with Ninoy Aquino at the King's Palace in Taif, Saudi Arabia. We also arranged and gave Ninoy his passport "Marcial Bonifacio" which he filled-up at Sheraton Hotel, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in this author's presence.
The author was able, with exiled Moro leaders in Saudi Arabia like the late Ambassador Mauyag Tamano, to convince the then OIC Secretary General Puzada to send a message to President Aquino recognizing her as the President of the Philippines in March 1, 1986. This was five days after EDSA I and the forty-nine (49) Muslim states were the first to recognize the legality of EDSA I. This fact has never been mentioned in the EDSA I history which is unfortunate because the Bangsa Moro conflict would have been settled much earlier.
President Aquino created a Constitutional Commission (ConCom) that drafted a new constitution for the country. The new constitution contained a provision for the creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The new constitution was ratified in 1987 and a new Congress was established in the same year. Art. X was the
reason why the MNLF broke-off negotiations with President Aquino and the MNLF did not recognize the Organic Act. The MILF adopted the same position and both boycotted the elections. Majority of the Muslims rejected or boycotted the said Act. It was for this reason that the Act was ratified by only four (4) provinces. The Christians and the Lumad's (culturally indigenous groups) did not reject per se the concept of regional autonomy.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. sponsored the bill in the Senate- the "Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao" which was signed into law as Republic Act (RA) No. 6734. The MNLF and MILF claimed that it was a betrayal of the Tripoli Agreement, a charge that Senator Pimentel refuted by claiming that the law implemented 99% of the Tripoli
Agreement. President Ramos in 1993 revived negotiations with Chairman Misuari to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement as a binding international obligation and commitment. This was an admission that RA 6734 did not implement fully the Tripoli
Agreement. The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was signed on September, 1996 between the MNLF/OIC and GRP in Jakarta and finally in Manila.
FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT (FPA) 1996
The FPA provided for the reorganization of the ARMM and the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and its Consultative Assembly (CA). The SPCPD was tasked with coordinating development programs and projects for Mindanao but the government failed to provide the necessary funds and support facilities to the SPCPD, the government had allegedly allocated FORTY ONE BILLION PESOS (P41B) but only Eighteen (18B) Billion Pesos had been disbursed according to SPCPD/ARMM officials form 1996-2000. It also did not cooperate with the SPCPD in implementing the development programs and projects for Mindanao.
There was inadequate funding and later in the Senate Hearings the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) admitted that the total releases for ARMM were below P18 Billion under the term of Regional Governor Misuari and most of the funds were for personnel services for the devolved agencies. There was nothing "Final" in the
Agreement because it was subject to the "Will of Congress" and the "Dictates of the Executive."
The creation of the Mindanao Coordinating Council had sidelined the SPCPD (established by E.O. 371), which was created by President Estrada to be the arm of the Office of the President in the planning, recommendation, coordination and monitoring/validating nationally and internationally funded socio-economic projects in the SZOPAD areas. The Chairman of the Consultative Assembly of SPCPD announced that there would be en masse resignations by the ASSEMBLYMEN because the MCC under EO 261, S.2000, and the SPCPD/ARMM were monitoring and validating agencies but were not represented in the council and no Muslim was appointed to the council. This author was invited to address the First Joint Sessions of the ARMM-RLA and the SPCPD-Consultative Assembly on September, 2001 upon the invitation of Chairman Misuari at General Santos City. The creation of the MCC and non-implementation of the FPA and the failure to enact the Organic Act agreed to in the FPA was denounced and the resolution was forwarded to GRP and the OIC Fact Finding Mission of the OIC. Fr. Eliseo Mercado claims that the SPCPD has been rendered virtually inutile as Chairman Nur Misuari has earlier declared. Without the SPCPD then, the FPA should be considered revoked at least by implication because there is no more implementing agency. After the ratification last August 14, 2001 of the Organic Law, then the SPCPD was ipso facto abolished and the SPDA was abolished in 2002.
From 1999 to 2002 the government failed to fully implement the FPA in its substantive provisions as far as MNLF/OIC is concerned (later as evidenced by Resolution No. 02-30, May 30, 2003, 30th ICFM at Tehran, Iran). At the same time the negotiations with the MILF broke down and led to renewed fighting between government
troops and this time, the MILF carried on the Moro armed struggle when the MNLF decided to stop fighting after they signed the FPA and its chairman became then ARMM regional governor and concurrent SPCPD chairman. On the other hand, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President in 1998 with the support of the MILF and many Islamic organizations because he signed an agreement with Ummah Party of Lanao del Sur to pursue peace and development and appoint a Muslim to the cabinet and other high positions. He also announced that he would establish a Malacanang in the south as well as implement the peace process and the FPA.
AGREEMENT WITH MILF
In August of 1998, the GRP and MILF signed an Interim Agreement to
continue the negotiations started with the GRP under President
Ramos. There was a lot of goodwill because the new AFP chief of
Staff, General Nazareno was even endorsed by MILF and the MILF
supported President Estrada on the week of the elections. The
President knew this, Presidential Adviser for Flagship Projects;
Robert Aventajado even brought the reply of the President to Camp
Abubakar and met with Chairman Hashim Salamat. He later became a
frequent visitor and gave socio-economic projects andinfrastructure
projects to MILF as confidence building measures and entered into
an agreement making the area a zone for peace. The GRP also
entered into agreements with MILF acknowledging the major camps of
the MILF and this was under President Estrada and not under
President Ramos. Everyone was euphoric that peace was at hand and
development and progress will follow as the peace dividends.
Later, the "all-out war" of President Estrada was launched against
the MILF despite the signing of the Aide Memoire between the GRP
and MILF. The rest is history chronicled in blood in Mindanao and
street protests all over the country. It culminated with EDSA II
and the ouster of Estrada.
The new President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared an “all-out
peace†policy and dropped all the charges against Chairman Salamat
and other MILF leaders and started new negotiations. The new all
out war against MILF was again launched by Secretary Angelo Reyes
in February 2002 during the Eidul Adha prayers in the early morning
of February 10, 2003 at the Islamic Center of the Buliok complex at
Pikit, Cotabato after there was already a decision by both the GRP
and MILF to meet at Kuala Lumpur to discuss the peace agreement.
Secretary Eduardo Ermita even said on TV that day that it was â
€œtragic†because of the peace process was going smoothly. The
panels met at Kuala Lumpur for exploratory talks and came up with a
Joint Statement on March 28, 2003. This was after the Davao
International Airport bombing on March 4, 2003. The March 28, 2003
agreement was not implemented because of another bombing on April
4, 2003 at Sasa Port, Davao City. Again Exploratory Talks were held
at Kuala Lumpur and another agreement was made in June 21, 2003.
This was again not implemented because despite the two unilateral
declarations of MILF to stop all offensive military actions on May
28 and June 12, 2003, respectively, the AFP did respond and
military operations against the MILF forces continued.
However, on July 18, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
announced the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between MILF and
GRP which was finally signed by MILF on July 20, 2003 because
Chairman Al Haj Murad was in the mountain areas at that time,
Chairman Hashim Salamat already died on July 13, 2003 and since
Murad signed the Ceasefire Agreement, it is significant because he
was already the Chairman of the MILF and the GRP signed through
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Chairman of the GRP panel. The
Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of
GRP-MILF met for the IOTH- CCCH meeting at Cotabato City on August
4, 2003. I was present as a guest being the Secretary General of
the Philippine Muslim Leaders Forum. The CCCH is now operational
and they are working to organize the Local Monitoring Team (LMT's)
to enforce the ceasefire. Malaysia is expected to send observers.
The ceasefire agreement between the GRP and MILF was signed
principally because of the insistence of the Philippine Muslim
Leaders Forum (PMLF) which is the broadest loose associations of
Muslim elected and appointing Muslim officials with the government
to stop military operations and enforce the ceasefire.
In a letter sent to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on July 16,
2003 by PMLF Chairman Deputy Speaker Gerry Salapuddin[2] presented
the situation and urgent need for a ceasefire to restart the peace
talks:
"The MILF officials met with U.S. officials for two hours yesterday
and have discussed the relationship and time-line with the U.S. in
the peace process. They are also coordinating with Malaysia.
After our lengthy discussions, we have agreed that the PMLF will
present to Your Excellency the herein suggestions to break the
impasse. I called Secretary Eduardo Ermita in the presence of the
MILF officials and told him about these suggestions, and he agreed
that this Memorandum be submitted today.
As agreed last June 21, 2003, once the GRP drops the charges and
cancels the warrants and begins the phased redeployment of military
forces in Buliok, which it has started with the return of the
Islamic Center, and the MILF has internally ordered their men at
arms to desist as they have desisted from offensive military
actions, the GRP will Issue a SOMO soonest after June 23, 2003.
Immediately, by June 28, 2003 the Coordinating Committee on the
Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) will be reconvened for the
permanent ceasefire and reactivate the Local Monitoring Teams
(LMTs). The GRP CCCH Chairman shall be headed by a General from the
AFP. The meeting was supposed to be held on June 28, 2003 in
Estosan Hotel, Cotabato. Arrangements were to be made by Secretary
Norberto Gonzales but the meeting did not push through because Sec.
Gonzales left for Europe. He rescheduled it for July 12, 2003 but
he GRP panel was informed late and therefore asked for
postponement. It was rescheduled to July 18, 2003 but Malaysia is
still waiting for the settlement of the Issue on the warrants of
arrest and the MILF is also waiting for the SOMO of the GRP.
In view of these developments, we agreed to propose that the
meeting be held immediately between the GRP and the MILF wherein
both parties will simultaneously declare the effectivity of the
ceasefire agreement of June 21, 2003, convene the CCCH, and
reactivate the LMTs.
The Malaysians will now be requested to send the international
monitoring teams to monitor the ceasefire in coordination with the
CCCH and the LMTs.
As provided in the GRP-MILF joint communique of May 6, 2003 signed
in Malaysia, "the MILF and GRP shall from an Ad-Hoc Joint Action
Group against criminal elements in order to pursue and apprehend
such criminal elements." Furthermore, the Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group
"will operate in tandem with their respective Coordinating
Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities."
The U.S. can now be requested to contribute funds for the
operation of the CCCH and the LMTs as well as discuss with the
GRP-MILF the areas or projects where the U.S. can contribute the
funds as offered."[3]
Again, in the Memorandum sent by the author to Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on GRP and MILF Negotiations dated July 17, 2003, where he
amplified in the Memorandum of Deputy Speaker for Mindanao Gerry
Salapudin and discussed the Minutes of the March 28, 2003 Joint
Statement and the June 21, 2003 GRP-MILF understanding and the
letter of US President Bush to Chairman Salamat, he stated that:
"The Joint Statement of March 28, 2003 between the GRP and the MILF
agreed on the following points:
1. Both parties reiterate their commitment to achieve a
comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the
conflict in Mindanao and resolve to undertake appropriate steps to
pave the way for the resumption of the formal GRP-MILF peace
negotiations;
2. Both parties reaffirm to implement effectively on the ground
all past and existing GRP-MILF agreements. Details of
implementation shall be discussed by the Panels;
Both parties agree to exercise mutual restraint to minimize, if
not put an end to, violence in Mindanao;
To normalize the situation and facilitate the early return of
evacuees to their places of origin and allow rehabilitation to
proceed, a new arrangement on the ground will be forged by both
parties;
The Philippine government takes note of the activation of the
Bangsamoro Development Agency;
Both parties agree to direct their respective Technical Committees
to work on the Implementing Guidelines of the Joint Communiqué
signed on May 6, 2002 to ensure that the peace process is not
adversely affected by the presence of criminal groups in Mindanao.
The Technical Committees will meet within two (2) weeks from today;
The parties agree to improve the existing mechanism for monitoring
of the cessation of hostilities including the composition of an
observer/monitoring groups as provided for in the Implementing
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001;
The parties reaffirm the provision on the grant of Safety and
Security Guarantees to MILF leaders and members who are directly
and principally involved in the GRP-MILF peace talks; and
Both parties express their gratitude for the gracious hospitality
of the Government of Malaysia in hosting and facilitating the
exploratory talks and for continuing its support to the peace
process."[4]
Under item no. 1, the phrase "resolved to undertake steps" means
the GRP agreed to undertake appropriate steps to cover the
withdrawal of AFP troops from Buliok Complex and recalls of
warrants of arrest issued against all MILF leaders and members.
The pull out and recalls will be conducted within 4 weeks from
today. While the term "resumption" means formal negotiation will
be back on track but Malaysia has to be consulted as agreed by both
parties. This item was again reiterated on June 21, 2003 between
the GRP and the MILF under item no. 3(b), "In response to this
positive development, the GRP has agreed to undertake the
following:
Facilitate the judicial process, in coordination with the
Department of Justice, leading to the lifting of the Warrants of
Arrests filed against MILF leaders and the Reward bounties for the
apprehension of certain MILF leaders;
Begin the process leading to the phased redeployment of military
forces from the Buliok Complex"[5]
It is very clear that the commitment to recall the Warrant of
Arrests against all MILF leaders should have been done within four
weeks from March 28, 2003 which was April 28, 2003 by the GRP. In
the June 21, 2003 Understanding mention again was made to
facilitate the judicial process with the DOJ to lift such warrants
and cancel the bounties. In the understanding of June 16, 2003
between the GRP and the MILF, the lifting of warrants and bounties
was an obligation of the GRP which they will consult with the
principal and the GRP agreed to these points. GRP has partially
withdrawn from Buliok Complex and returned the Islamic Center to
Datu Abbas Pendatun, Sanggunian Member of North Cotabato.
4. In the June 21, 2003 understanding, the GRP stated that "The
June 20, 2003 MILF Statement entitled "Policy Statement of MILF
Chair Salamat Hashim Rejecting Terror as a Means to Resolve
Differences" substantially responds to the need for the MILF to
publicly condemn terrorism and terrorist organizations."[6] The
GRP acceptance should have led to the GRP issuances of SOMO at the
soonest possible time immediately after June 23, 2003. A meeting of
the CCCH was scheduled on June 28, 2003 at Estosan, Cotabato City
to be coordinated by Sec. Gonzales and Atty. Ali. The purpose was
to re-establish the ceasefire under the agreement of June 2001 and
reactivated the LMT's. The Malaysian Monitoring Team will be
fielded to monitor the ceasefire all over the areas of conflict.
The GRP has already requested Malaysia.
6. In the understanding of June 21, 2003, On the issue of Chairman
Salamat's presence during the peace negotiations, the MILF noted
that Chairman Salamat has made known his intention to be present
during the finalization of the GRP-MILF Peace Agreement and on the
actual signing of the said Agreement.
The GRP, noting that Chairman Salamat's presence would be much
preferred during the talks, will request for Chairman Salamat's
presence during the Opening Ceremony for the resumption of formal
talks.[7] The MILF Panel informed the PMLF in our talks last June
15, 2003 that Chairman Salamat has agreed to be present in the
Opening Ceremony as confirmed to you in the memo of the PMLF.
7. Going back to the May 20, 2003 letter of Chairman Salamat to
President Bush, this was actually the 2nd letter. The 1st letter
(January 20, 2003) was a reply to US Ambassador Riciardone when he
spoke before the FCAP when he raised the questions: "The US
Government's desire to know What the MILF want or how its (the
problem) going to be resolved". The MILF said "We take this
opportunity to inform Your Excellency that the MILF is a national
liberation organization, with leadership supported by the Bangsa
Moro People, and with legitimate political goal to pursue the right
of the Moro nation to determine their future and political status.
As part of this process, we have an on-going negotiation with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to arrive at a
negotiated political settlement of the Mindanao conflict and the
Bangsa Moro problem, through the mediation and tender of good
offices of the Government of Malaysia."[8]
8. It is this letter that was answered by the Joint Statement of US
President and Arroyo on May 19, 2003 and the speech of Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage explaining the new US Policy
which was accepted by MILF of their May 20, 2003 letter. The US
President instructed Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly to
reply on June 18, 2003 to the letter of Chairman Salamat dated May
20, 2003. This letter was hand carried by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Mathew Dailey and met with the MILF officials.
The basic points of the letter are:
-The United States Government is committed to the territorial
integrity of the Philippines.
-The United States recognizes that the Muslims of the southern
Philippines have serious, legitimate grievances that must be
addressed.
-The United States wishes to see an end to the violence in the
southern Philippines and is working to assist the Republic of the
Philippines in addressing the root causes of that violence.
-The United States is concerned about the links between the MILF
and international terrorist organizations and asks that those links
be severed immediately.
-The United States stands ready to support, both politically and
financially, a bon fide peace process between the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF.
-The United States appreciates the notable work that the Government
of Malaysia has performed in this connection over the last two
years, and will not seek to supplant Kuala Lumpur; indeed, we week
to work with the Malaysians for a successful peace settlement.
-The United States Government will not mediate between the
Government of the Philippines, nor will it participate in the
negotiations directly. We have asked the United States Institute
of Peace, a respected conflict-resolution organization, to
encourage the negotiation process in coordination with the
Government of Malaysia. The USIP is ready to begin this task as
soon as we have a clear signal from you as to your readiness to
follow through."[9]
This declaration of the US government addressed to the leader of a
revolutionary organizations is a "First" for the US and World
Affairs and also a "First" for the Bangsamoro Movement because MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari never received such a communication from the
US President, particularly at this time when the United States has
emerged as the only super power in the world. This policy
statement of the US President must be seriously considered by the
GRP because of the proposed implications not only in the
Philippines or Mindanao or the Asian but in the whole Muslim world.
The US offer of political and financial assistance to a bona fide
peace process be properly accepted and understood.[10]
It is a rebuff to the peace process because it is considered by the
United States as not bona fide or in bad faith. Both parties must
seriously evaluate their actions to restore confidence to the peace
process.
9. The assignment of the US government of the US Institute of Peace
(USIP) is a direct involvement of the US government because the
USIP is a Federal Institution funded by the US government since
1984 with the Congressional mandate and the Board of Directors are
all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate just
like the members of the US Supreme Court. They have already
scheduled meeting with MILF and plan exchange of missions.
10. It is imperative that the GRP and MILF must implement their
agreements which are binding international obligations of both
parties mediated by Malaysia in March 28, 2003 and June 21, 2003
particularly convening the meeting of the CCCH and simultaneously
declare the resumption of the ceasefire under the agreement of 2001
and cancel all the warrants of arrests and bounties against all the
accused MILF. This is also the suggestion of the US as well as
Malaysia and other OIC countries in support of the appeal of
churches and other religious groups and civil society. The
conclusion of the US letter to Chairman Salamat clearly manifests
the US concern for a peaceful political settlement:
"I note with satisfaction that the MILF has declared a temporary
ceasefire, which I urge you to extend until a settlement is
concluded. Both sides need to refrain from actions that merely
perpetuate the cycle of violence. Neither side can win this
conflict on the battlefield; however, both the MILF and the
Republic of the Philippines can achieve a lasting victory for the
people of Mindanao by coming to a settlement."[11]
The two Memoranda played a vital role in convincing President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to declare the ceasefire on July 18, 2003,
five (5) days after the death of Chairman Hashim Salamat which was
only confirmed on August 4, 2003 during the resumption of the
meetings of the CCCH to re-establish the ceasefire.
-------END OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
-------
SUPladong REMOntado? SUPer REvolutionary MOro? Ano kaya ang tunay
na kahulugan nito? E-2-2-LOY
ALSO:
-------START OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
Bangsa Moro Conflict: Historical Antecedents and Present Impact
Posted on April 17, 2007.
Filed under: Bangsa Moro, History, Mindanao, Moroland, Socio-
Political | Tags: Abu Sayyaf, Bangsa Moro, historical roots, Islam,
MILF, Mindanao, Philippines |
In September 2000, I was invited to deliver a speech/lecture on the
Social Impact of the Moro Conflict at the University of the
Philippines in Los Banos. Later, I uploaded the speech in my
website and in one web forum I joined. Later, I found out that this
speech has been linked and/or re-published in various websites and
web fora. Some of the cited links do not exist anymore. At any
rate, here it is:
**********************************
A few years ago, I visited my girl friend's house. Her
septuagenarian Visayan grandmother was visiting them at the time.
Upon seeing me, the grandmother fled the room. She knew that her
granddaughter was going out with a Moro. But meeting a Moro in
person seemed to be too unnerving for the old lady. She is not an
illiterate barrio folk. She is a retired schoolteacher, her nephew
(i.e., her brother's son) is a governor and all her children are
degree-holders, two of them are lawyers.
I had a sexagenarian office mate who told me that when he was
growing up in Bicol, the kids' parents usually scare the children
off by shouting "the Moros are coming!" That announcement usually
made the kids run immediately to their houses for safety.
These two anecdotal samples illustrate the social impact of the
Mindanao conflict “ not of the present MILF/Abu Sayyaf crisis nor
of the MNLF wars in the 1970s. These were the effects on the
intermittent warfare between the Moros and the Spanish from the
16th to the 19th century. Although the Spanish have gone for more
than a hundred years now, the effects on the collective psyche of
the Filipinos remain.
The social impact of the present Mindanao conflict will simply be a
reiteration or reinforcement of the impact of the Moro conflict
since the arrival of the Spanish to these Islands. The social
impact of the Mindanao Conflict today is more or less the same as
the social impact of the late 60s to early 70s conflict between the
AFP-supported Christian vigilante groups led by the notorious
Ilagas and the various Moro private armies like the Baracudas,
Blackshirts, PUSA, etc. The social impact of today's Mindanao
conflict is more or less the same as that of the MNLF wars in the
˜70s. And for some of the parties concerned, the social impact of
the present Mindanao conflict is the same as that of the Moro Wars
during the American and Spanish eras. When it comes to Mindanao,
some things never change. There are of course variations, relating
to present conditions.
Perhaps what is needed now is to truly understand the Moro Problem,
from the viewpoint of the Moros. And only a thorough understanding
of history can give light to this issue. However, the Filipino
majority is reluctant to talk about history. They always claim that
the past should be buried and that everyone should be forward-
looking. During every crisis in Mindanao, the Christian Filipino
talk, write and generally disseminate their ideas on supposed
causes of the conflict and give various solutions to the conflict
greater access to education, more infrastructures, coddling Moro
leaders, peace negotiations, etc.
The Moros who call everyone's attention to historical past are
called obscurantists, obstructionists or simply rabble-rousers. But
the adage "he who forgets his past is sure to repeat it" cannot be
truer when applied to the so-called Moro Problem. No solution can
be found if the underlying causes are not considered. The Moros,
unlike the Christianized Filipinos, have a living culture, or as
the French say, culture vivant. This culture is steeped in history.
For example, the greatness of a man is not measured by how much
money he has in the bank, but for the most part, his bloodline
i.e., who his father, mother, grandparents and ancestors were.
Former US President John Quincy Adams in his defense of the Amistad
African prisoners declared that "Who we are is who we were." For
the Moros, that statement is almost sacrosanct.
THE MYTHS ABOUT MORO-PHILIPPINE HISTORY
The Filipinos as ONE nation since time immemorial
It must be emphasized and acknowledged that the Moros and the
Indios (the Christianized Filipinos) never constituted a nation and
that it was only in 1946, upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic that the Moros and the Indios became part of one nation-
state.
The World Maps
The earliest world map that included “the Philippines†is on
display at the Malacanang Museum. But lo and behold, the
Philippines was not on the map, only Mindanao and Palawan were
there. It is proof positive that before the Western world ever
heard of the Philippines, they already knew Mindanao and Palawan.
In a 1716 map, a group of Islands was labeled I. Philippinae
(Philippine Islands, plural) But Mindanao Island was also labeled.
This could be construed as indicating that Mindanao Island was not
part of the Philippine Islands. In an 18th European century map,
North Borneo was labeled as "Territories belonging to the Sultan of
Sulu."
The Myth of the Spanish Conquest of Moroland
The Christian majority in the country propagates the myth that
although the Moros fought, they were nevertheless conquered by the
Spaniards. History books call the Moro wars as rebellions that were
answered by Spanish punitive expeditions.
Going back to history, a look at the views of the other Europeans
would give a more objective conclusion. Let us see what the
Europeans themselves thought. The 14th Dutch governor of Moluccas,
Simon Cos, brushed away Spanish claims on Mindanao arguing that if
such claims were based on raiding villages, then the Maguindanaons
had much more territory to claim than the Spaniards. On May 16,
1658, Gov. Cos wrote to his superiors:
"The Muslims have the Spanish settlements burning and
blazing every year and take some 500 captives per raid, while the
Spaniards got only one Maguindanao last year."
When the French led by Admiral Cecille blockaded Basilan in 1845,
the Spanish governor protested alleging that Basilan had recognized
Spain's sovereignty just the year before, in February 1844. (This
alone is telling. This means that after almost 200 years in the
Philippines, the Spanish admitted that Basilan was still not under
their control.) The French answer was to force the Basilan datus to
sign a document affirming the "absolute independence of Basilan
vis-a-vis Spain" on January 13, 1845 aboard the steamer Archimede.
And on February 20, 1845, France forced the Sulu Sultan to formally
cede Basilan Island to France in exchange for 100,000 piastres or
500,000 French francs. The French Admiral totally ignored Spanish
protests. However, the French King, Louis Philippe decided against
taking Basilan although the French Cabinet already approved the
annexation, even allocating the budget for Basilan for that year.
In fact, France has more right than Spain to claim Basilan since
they got a formal cession from the Sultan of Sulu as well as formal
written agreement from the Basilan datus.
In answer to Spanish claims that the Moros were mere pirates, the
British Earl of Denby's instruction to Consul Palgrave on Aug. 25,
1877 stated:
"Her Majesty's government has never regarded the Sultan of
Sulu as a pirate; they never admitted the claim of Spain to
sovereignty over the archipelago;and in the interests of British
trade, they never have been disposed to regard with favor any
extension of Spanish authority or influence in the Sulu waters".
And what did the Spanish themselves think? In a letter by Spanish
Captain-General Marquma to the King of Spain in the late 18th
century, he wrote:
"From this time…these Moros have not ceased to infest our
colonies. Innumerable are the Indios they have captured, the
ranches they have destroyed and the vessels they have taken. It
seems as if God has preserved them for vengeance on the Spanish
that they have not been able to subject them in in 200years in
spite of the expeditions sent against them, the armaments spent
every year to pursue them. In a very little while, we conquered the
islands of the Philippines, but the little islands of Sulu, parts
of Mindanao and other islands nearby, we have not been able to
subjugate to this very day."
Scanning through the various Spanish reports and other official
documents ”bandos y circulares, cartas, cedularios, memorias, etc.“
one could see the pain and destruction suffered by the Spanish
masters and their Indio subjects at the hands of the Moros. The
Moros regularly raided Spanish settlements in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. The report of Spanish Governor-General Manuel de Arandia
to the King of Spain dated May 24, 1755 enumerated the losses
suffered by the Spanish from the Moros, who attacked with impunity
most of the Spanish settlements in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao
which brought the Islands practically to its knees ("en el
deplorable estado y fatal sistema").
Even the Americans belittled Spanish claims in Mindanao. In his
Foreword to his book, Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros,
Vic Hurley wrote:
"The close of the unsuccessful Spanish conquest of Moroland
marked the beginning of the end of one of the most remarkable
resistance in the annals of military history. The Moslems has
staged a bitter and uninterrupted warfare against the might of
Spain for a period of 377 years. It is doubtful if this record has
been equaled in the whole bloody history of military aggression.
The Dons, accustomed to the easy conquests of Peru and Mexico, met
their match and more in the jungles of Mindanao."
Historical records show that the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan were
never conquered by Spain and therefore the Treaty of Paris in 1898
was void ab initio with regards to Mindanao. The US had no right to
take over Moroland, except through the law of Conquest.
The Myth of Socio-Economic-Political Backwardness
The Filipino also insist that it was Spain that brought
civilization to the Philippines. The former President Fidel Ramos
once declared that before the coming of Spain, the natives of the
country had nothing but a crude political system known as
barangays. The political and economic systems of the sultanates
were certainly more complex than the Indios' barangay systems. The
Dutch anthropologist Ruurdje Laarhoven has this to say about the
Maguindanao sultanate in the 17th century:
"The Maguindanao rulers must be credited for their astuteness
in utilizing their strategic position between the Spanish-
controlled Philippines and the Dutch-controlled Moluccas. They were
able to mobilize the rivalry of these European powers to neutralize
each other while successfully maintaining its independence and
advancing its own political development. Even factional struggles
within the Mindanao confederacy can be seen positively as
indicators of political evolution towards a supra-tribal state able
to harness all human and ecological resources within its territory
for higher political goals, able to operate as a state in a larger
political arena defined by the presence of other state-organized
powers such as the Dutch, English and Spanish operating in
Southeast Asia." (Laarhoven : 1989, p. 181)
James F. Warren, in his book, The Sulu Zone, wrote:
"The source of Sulu's hegemony after 1768 was its role as a
regional emporium in the commerce between European traders,
southeast Asian realms and China. The increasing magnitude of this
external trade made regional distribution the dominant pattern of
the economy of the Tausug state and established itsascendancy in
the region."
The Sultanates of Maguindanao, Sulu and Buayan entered into several
treaties with European powers like Netherlands, England and even
Spain. European powers never entered into treaties with barangay
datus. Blood compact was the preferred mode of the Europeans when
negotiating with barangay chieftains.
The Filipino people were united in their desire for Independence
from the US.
During the American Occupation, the great majority of the Moros
fought for independence through peaceful and even violent means.
And they repeatedly communicated their desire for Independence. And
if they could not have Independence, they would rather be with the
Americans than with the Filipinos. The Wood-Forbes Commission
Report of 1922 stated:
"The Moros are a unit against independence and are united
for continuance of American control and, in case of separation of
the Philippines from the US, desire their portion of the Islands to
be retained as American territory under American control. The
pagans and non-Christians, constituting 10% of the population, are
for continued American control. They want peace and security, These
the Americans have given them."
Countering Filipino propaganda that the Americans simply wanted to
grab the lands of the Moros, Datu Gumbay Piang of Buayan declared
in a speech in 1926 that the Moros "would be between two fearful
and objectionable daggers: American at the one side and Filipino at
the other. As a defenseless people they would have no alternative
but choose which dagger would be less injurious. And, funny to say,
they have already, since long ago, chosen the American dagger."
With the intensified fight for Philippine Independence led by
Manuel L. Quezon, the Moros sent various petitions to the US
President and the US Congress. On June 9, 1921, the Moros of Sulu
sent a petition to the US government which stated:
"We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to
conquer us. If the U.S. quits the Philippines, and the Filipinos
attempt to govern us, we will fight."
On February 4, 1924, another petition to the US Congress was signed
by more than 100 datus led the Maguindanao Sultan Mangigin. The
petition in part reads:
"In the event that the United States grant independence to
the Philippine Islands without provision for our retention under
the American flag, it is our firm intention and resolve to declare
ourselves an independent Constitutional sultanate to be known to
the world as Moro Nation."
The Moros found sympathetic ears in the US Congress. On May 6,
1926, Congressman Robert L. Bacon of New York gave a stirring
speech in support of the Moros. He said:
"Their (the Moros') so-called representation in the
Philippine Legislature is a farce and a mockery. They are
deliberately denied any share or participation in the government.
They have no elective representatives…They have no magistrates,
no judges, no public prosecutor drawn from their own people. And
the guardians of law and order in their region “constabulary“ are
practically drawn from the ranks of their hereditary enemies “the
Filipinos." The Filipinos are their lawmakers, their governors,
their judges, their persecutors and their policemen. To these
conditions the Moros respond by giving nothing but hate and
unwilling submission."
Some 75 years later, and the Moros find themselves still with no
representation in the Senate, very few judges, and the guardians of
law and public order “the military and police“ are still
practically drawn from the ranks of the Filipinos. Congressman
Bacon added:
"The Philippine Islands are divided into two very distinct
areas “the Christian provinces and the Mohammedan territory".These
two regions belong to different and opposed civilizations “the
Christian world and Islam."
Congressman Bacon sponsored a bill that would retain Mindanao and
Sulu in the event of Philippine independence. Other similar bills,
the Roger, Cooper and Kies bills, were also deliberated in the US
Congress.
During the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, 189
ranking Maranao datus sent an appeal to the US Government through
the Governor-General that stated:
"With regard to the forthcoming Philippine independence, we
foresee that the condition will be characterized by unrest,
suffering and misery"
One more discriminatory act of our Christian Filipino
Associates is shown in the recent constitution of the Philippine
Commonwealth. In that constitution, no provision whatsoever is made
that would operate for the welfare of the Moros, the (provision of
the) constitution are all for the welfare of the Christian
Filipinos and nothing for the Moros. As proof of this, our delegate
did not sign the constitution.
We do not want to be included in the Philippine
Independence (for) once an independent Philippines is launched
there will be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos
because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived
harmoniously. It is not proper for two antagonizing peoples live
together under Philippine Independence.
The Dansalan Declaration, as it came to be known went on to say
that the Maranaos would rather "drown in the lake" than be included
in the Philippine Independence.
The Honeymoon Years
Unfortunately for the Moros, World War II came about. When the US
granted Philippine independence after the war, the Moros neither
had the resources nor inclination to fight another war. Thus the
"honeymoon" with the Philippine Republic began, with very few
troubles like the Kamlon rebellion.
But in 1969, with the discovery of the Jabidah massacre, the Moros
realized that the honeymoon was over. From then on, up to the
present, the Moro fight continues.
The Present Conflict
It must be very clear to everyone that the Moro conflict today did
not begin in 1969. It did not begin with Misuari, Salamat or Abbas,
Jr. In 1969, they were the Young Turks but the independence
movement was led by the elders Congressman Lucman, Senator Pendatun
and other Moro leaders.
In 1972, President. Marcos told OIC officials that the Moros were
not united and could never unite, that Maranaos hate Maguindanaos
and both hate the Tausugs, etc., and that the Nationalistas would
not sit with a Liberal, etc.
The OIC then challenged the Moro community to refute Mr. Marcos’s
allegation. Thus was born the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP). The founding directors included Maranao, Tausug,
Maguindanao, Nationalista and Liberal Party leaders. For the first
time political rivals Lucman and Dimaporo, Sinsuat and Pendatun,
and other Moro leaders like Anni, Abubakar, Sen, Tamano, Sen.
Alonto and a host of others including the Young Turks Abbas, Jr.,
Misuari and Salamat joined together in one organization to prove to
the Islamic countries that the Moros were united. The founding
chair of IDP was Dr. C. Adib Majul, then the Dean of the UP College
of Arts and Sciences. Abbas, Jr. was the Secretary-General.
The present conflict in Mindanao does not pertain to only the MILF
and the Abu Sayyaf, although they are the only ones fighting now.
The MNLF cadres are still very much there. The Islamic Command
Council is newly-formed but composed of former MNLF commanders. The
MNLF-Reformists can regroup anytime. There are still thousands of
armed Moros simply waiting for the most opportune time.
An all-out war against the MILF is indeed ill-advised because the
repercussions might be far worse. An all-out war between the AFP
and the MILF will surely expand to an all-out war between the AFP
and all Moro armed groups, which could very well escalate into a
full-scale civil war between the Moros and the Indios.
Time for Peace
Wars will only bring more wars. The Bangsa Moro enjoys the
inalienable right of self-determination. The 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of the United Nations states:
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
It is high time that the Bangsa Moro be asked on what it really
wants. Does it want to remain in the present set-up? Do the Moros
prefer an autonomous region within the Republic? Do they want a
federal form of government? Or do they want independence? A clean
and honest referendum can give the answer, and everyone should
abide by the outcome.
Social Impact of the Present Conflict
The present conflict has already shown the negative impacts on the
communities. The degree of intolerance by both communities towards
each other has dramatically increased. The popularity of an â
€œall-out war†policy among the Christian population is evident as
shown by the surge in the popularity rating of President Estrada.
A more serious effect is the apparent success of the Abu Sayyaf and
the apparent failure of the MILF. This means that more Moros would
now be inclined to go the way of terrorism instead of a semi-
conventional warfare as practiced by the MILF.
But there are interesting effects, too. Many Christian
intellectuals are now seeing the practicality in Moro separatism.
More Moro wars would create greater havoc on the economy of the
whole country. Dan Mariano, Executive Editor of the Philippine Post
wrote in his column of May 13, 2000 the ff.:
If only they would be honest about it, the ordinary
Filipinos ”the so-called Christians” feel little kinship and
affinity for those whom they perfunctorily refer to as "Muslim
brothers." There is a great deal of discrimination and prejudice
against the Moros that is expressed officially, as in the
disenfranchisement of entire Muslim communities from the body
politic, and unofficially, as in chauvinistic jokes that portray
Moros as crude, opportunistic yokels.
The Moros are a people that have been set apart from the
Filipino nation by history, faith and culture. Their integration
into the Philippine Republic was a fabrication of colonialism. The
creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao merely
acknowledged this fact, but it did not go far enough to rectify a
centuries-old mistake.
The creation of a homeland that the Moros can truly call
their own is the only intelligent solution to the Mindanao problem.
When this comes to pass, only then can Filipinos and Moros learn to
live in peace — as good neighbors.
================================================================
Speech delivered by Datu Jamal Ashley Abbas at the University of
the Philippines in Los Banos on 5 Sept. 2000
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLAIR, EMMA HELEN and James Robertson (eds.) The Philippine
Islands, 1493-1898 , Cleveland: 1904
DERY, LUIS CAMARA The Kris in Philippine History: A Study of the
Impact of Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1571-1896 self-published : 1997
HURLEY, VIC Swish of the Cross, The Story of the Moros, E.P. Dutton
& Co., USA: 1936
GEORGE, T.J.S. Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine
Politics, Oxford Univ. Press, Kuala Lumpur: 1980
GOWING, PETER G. Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of
Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920, UP Press, Q.C.: 1977
JUBAIR, SALAH A Nation Under Endless Tyranny, 2nd ed., Lahore: 1997
LAARHOVEN, RUURDJE Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, The Maguindanao
Sultanate in the 17th Century, New Day, Q.C.: 1989
MAJUL, CESAR ADIB Muslims in the Philippines, 3rd edition, UP
Press, Q.C.: 1999
MAN, CHE W. K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines
and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Ateneo de Manila Press, Q.C.:
1990
NARDIN, DENIS France and the Philippines: From the Beginning to the
End of the Spanish Regime, translated by Ma. Theresa Cruz, National
Historical Institute: 1989
PIGAFETTA, ANTONIO Magellan's Voyage Around The World, 1906 edition
RASUL, JAINAL D. The Philippine Muslims: Struggle for Identity,
Nueva Press, Manila: 1970
SALEEBY, NAJEEB MITRY Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion,
Manila: 1905
TAN, SAMUEL K. The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle 1900-1972,
Filipinas Foundation, Q.C. 1977
THOMAS, RALPH Muslim But Filipino: The Integration of Philippine
Muslims, 1917-1946, PhD dissertation GSAS, Univ. of Pennsylvania:
1971
-------END OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
9:19 p.m. Manila Time
AS THE SUPREMO* OF THIS MY BLOG:) I have decided to insert these four (4) writings RE BANGSAMORO before continuing my usual antique antics. These are EXTREMELY IMPORTANT for the HISTORY OF THIS COUNTRY & should be read by everyone, FOREIGNERS, FILIPINOS, INDIOS, MOROS, etcetc. The ABBAS BROTHERS were a pair of VERY BRIGHT MORO LEADERS from a mixed M'RANAW-TAUSUG ancestry. In this first article, the author holds firmly to the conviction that his brother was MURDERED. ABBAS also relates important details RE NINOY AQUINO... This point-of-view from the MUSLIM MOROS is what I have termed the "BANGSAMORO PERSPECTIVE" on PHILIPPINE HISTORY.
-------START OF COPIED ABBAS ARTICLE-------
March 27, 2007
WAR IN MORO LAND (Last Phase) by Jun Abbas | History, Socio-
Political, Bangsa Moro, Moroland, Religious/Cultural
jamalashley @ 3:07 am
March 31 is the birth anniversary of Macapanton Rashid Yahya Abbas, Jr., my eldest brother. Among our siblings, I was probably the one closest to him during the years 1977-91. We were together in Saudi Arabia from 1977 to 1983 and again in 1985. We were also briefly together in Paris, France. I also helped him put up an office in Kuala Lumpur in 1985. When he came back to the Philippines, he set up the SSB Holdings, Inc. SSB was practically a 2-man job. In his unsuccessful bid for the Philippine Senate in1992, I was his Campaign Chief of Staff. After the elections, our paths drifted apart. He concentrated more in Mindanao. The last 10 years of his life centered on his wife and children in Lanao and Metro Manila.
On 17 September 2003, Jun Abbas was, as far as I am concerned, murdered at the Makati Medical Center.
Returning from Mindanao after speaking and other official engagements, Jun proceeded to Makati Medical Center for an executive check-up. He was administered a massive dose of dextrose “3 bottles within three hours“ supposedly to lower his sugar count
and to counter his alleged dehydration. While the third bottle was filling his body organs with liquid, he coughed; and, later, he was gasping for breath. His wife, daughters and sister desperately called for a doctor but nobody came. They implored the nurses to call any doctor. Incredibly, NOT A SINGLE DOCTOR WAS AVAILABLE at
the supposedly top-notch Makati Medical Center. Yet when it was all over for Jun, the doctors suddenly came rushing from nowhere.
When I later told my doctor-friends about it, they all said that Jun died of DROWNING. Nobody could survive such a massive dose of dextrose in so short a time.
A few weeks before this happened; Jun led a top-level Moro delegation to meet with President GMA. The Moros, which included almost all elected and appointed top government officials, demanded the ouster of a top Cabinet official, whom the Moros accused as responsible for escalating the war in Mindanao. GMA agreed and sacked the official.
After Jun's passing away, that top official was back at the Cabinet.
For years, I had been telling him to write his memoirs on the Bangsa Moro revolution if he wanted history to recognize his central role in it. There are already many versions floating around.
Amazingly, just before he died, he submitted to Ateneo a long and rambling essay where he mentioned his role in the revolutionary movement. The Ateneo Law Journal editors must have realized the importance of such a document. They had it published immediately, including all the grammatical errors.
Jun Abbas's last published article was
IS A BANGSA MORO STATE WITHIN A FEDERATION THE SOLUTION?
(Ateneo Law Journal Vol. 48 Sept 2003)
(Macapanton Rashid Yahya Abbas, Jr, was Full Professor at the King Abdulaziz University in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in the mid to late 1970s)
Here is an excerpt from that article:
===========================
WAR IN MORO LAND (Last Phase)
The brief history of the present Bangsa Moro Struggle, which I will present in the first person because I was one of the original members of the movement from 1965 onward. This is perhaps the first time I will be writing on this matter because I want the Bangsa Moro Youth and the Filipino People to understand the Islamic Struggle of our people while there are still some of the originators of the struggle who are still alive and involved in different capacities in the society.
Even before the Jabidah Massacre in 1968, the Muslim students organized on the national level, the CNI Scholars Association and the Muslim Students Association of the Philippines which started as social organizations. In 1965, because of the Vietnam War and massive influx of settlers to Mindanao, the student leaders from UP
injected these issues and started the militancy of the Muslim students. The first issue to be questioned was the policy of "National Integration"" because the Muslims believe that they can not be integrated culturally and socially to the Philippine society that is based on Christian values and acceptance, of Spanish colonialism as a blessing and heritage that resulted to the Christianization of the Philippines. The scholars and the Commission on National Integration supported this position and what the country needed was "unity in diversity" and possibly a "federal system of government" since amendments to the constitution was on the national agenda for 1971.
The Muslim Youth organized that National Coordinating Council for Islamic Affairs (NACCIA) and issued a Manifesto entitled "Al Wahid" in 1967 calling on the Filipino leadership to pay greater attention to the miserable situation of the Muslims before
rebellion will break out. There was a massive influx of settlers to the Muslim areas and displacement of Muslims and Lumads was widespread. The government was encouraging the immigration of settlers from Visayas especially from Negros provinces, Leyte, Samar, and Iloilo, because of the problems of the sugar plantation
workers. There were also massive logging activities denuding the Mindanao forests by concessionaires from Luzon like the Antoninos, Sarmientos, Valencias, Floreindos, Alcantaras, etc.. These new economic elite who were the agents of Korean, Japanese, US and European companies destroyed the forests of Mindanao which were preserved because of the failure to colonize the Bangsa Moro.
These groups that destroyed the environment are now the industrial and financial controllers of the region including installing their proteges in the political positions and even dictate policies for the Bangsa Moro. The NACCIA warned that these economic aggressions against the Muslims in their homeland and political displacement will be met with armed struggle. The government did not listen as usual.
In 1968, trainees from Sulu (Sulu and Tawi-tawi was one province then) in the Army were massacred by their officers at Corregidor when they demanded their pay and to return to their homes because they refused to go Sabah to infiltrate and start the rebellion to reclaim Sabah for the Philippines. The Commanding Officer was Major
Eddie Martelino, an alleged convert to Islam (who was later executed by the MNLF-Malaysians in Sabah after his capture sometime in 1978-79). This incident led Congressmen Rashid Lucman, Salipada Pendatun and Salih Ututalum to demand congressional investigations backed by massive youth demonstrations which took over the Congress premises. Only Congressmen Indanan Ani and Ali Dimaporo sided with
President Marcos.
The Union of Islamic Forces and Organizations composed of all the National Muslim organizations under the leadership of Sultan Rashid Lucman was organized. I was elected Secretary General. My assignment was to organize the demonstrations. I organized and led the demonstrations in front of Congress while Nur Misuari and Abul
Alonto organized the sit-in at Freedom Park, Malacanang. I led the demonstration in Jolo the first and last anti-government demonstration of around 10,000 persons and in Cotabato City with the MIM and Marawi City with the BMLF leaders. I was then Private Secretary to Commissioner Tamano at CNI, so, I filed my resignation which was not accepted, but I was allowed to go on leave of absence by Executive Secretary Rafael Salas because I refused to desist from leading the demonstrations. I told him, "if Ilonggo soldiers were massacred, would you keep silent because you are in
government?" He smiled and told me that he will inform President Marcos, and they will not take any action against me. Despite my action, my brother-in-law was taken as the Muslim Senatorial candidate. Maybe Marcos would have dealt with the Muslims properly if only Martial Law was not declared. In that election, only Congressman Pendatun was returned to Congress because of massive fraud and vote buying which defeated the anti-Marcos Congressmen but a Muslim senator was elected in the person of Senator Mamintal Tamano.
The foreign trained Top 90 has returned home and were welcomed by Senator Ninoy Aquino at Malabang, Lanao Sur. The local training camps were established and the Top 90 became the trainors. At that time, the secret organization was the Bangsa Moro Liberation Front (BMLF) which was later named Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization
(BMLO) under Sultan Rashid Lucman and General Salipada Pendatun.
The Top 90 also secretly organized the Moro National Liberation Front headed by Nur Misuari and Abul Alonto. The young Ulama, professionals and youth leaders were with the BMLF. This was also the first time that Bangsa Moro was used to refer to the Muslims in the Philippines. The MNLF used Moro only. This came after the Muslim Youth National Assembly (MYNA) wherein, over 200 youth leaders met in Zamboanga City at the same time with the Muslim Association of the Philippines Congress in 1969. Almost all the future leaders of the MNLF, MILF, BMLO and political leaders of the
Muslims were present.
The MYNA debated independence or federation as the exercise of the right of self-determination of the Bangsa Moro people. After two days, the vote that won was to participate in the Constitutional Convention election of 1971 and proposed a Federal system to get a Bangsa Moro state. That is why, Nur Misuari, Mike Mastura, Musib Buat, Hussin Pangato of MIM, others and myself ran in the Concon elections and only Mike Mastura was able to make it due to massive cheating and vote buying to assure Marcos a majority. The Federal proposal never saw the light of day in the Concon and the Constitution of 1973 did not contain any provision to respect Bangsa Moro right of self-determination. Only Delegate Banjamin Abubakar of Sulu refused to vote for the approval of the Constitution and he truly represented the aspirations of the Bangsa Moro people and not the Muslim delegates who capitulated to Marcos.[1]
The 1970-72 period saw the escalation of violence between the Barracudas and Ilagas in Lanao Norte and Black shirts and Ilagas in the Cotabato massacres. The Ilagas “rats†were paramilitary forces of President Ferdinand E. Marcos and supported by the AFP directly or indirectly. The Mindanao Independence Movement was organized by Datu Udtog Matalam, patriarch of Cotabato, in 1969 which led to the violent clashes and became the stimulus for the government and Christian militias to launch massacres against unarmed Muslims as in the Manile, Cotabato massacre of Muslims in a Masjid (mosque); the Lutayan; the Tacub; the IPIL and the Pata, Sulu massacres etc. The people of Buldon fought a battle against the AFP wherein the air force, artillery and tanks were used against a Moro town. They fought until Mayor Tomatic Aratuc met with President Marcos and the government forces were withdrawn.
That time the President was the real Commander-in-Chief and was responsible for all the military assaults on the Moro Communities. This situation continued and the BMLF under Sultan Lucman and General Pendatun decided to file genocide charges against President Marcos at the UN and also at the OIC. A Petition was filed with UN Commission on Human Rights, through the UN Office in Manila in 1971. This was reported on the BBC world radio and was heard by Col. Ghadaffi of Libya who was then the new leader of his country and decided to respond. He sent his Foreign Minister Saleh Buoyaser to Manila as a Professor to attend the World Universities Conference. That was how the Bangsa Moro case was internationalized. This led to the organization of the Islamic Directorate of the Philippines (IDP) where all the Muslim political leaders joined as well the youth leaders including the writer,
Misuari and Salamat. Dean Ceasar Adib Majul was elected Chair as non-partisan leader and this author Secretary General.
OIC RECOGNITION
As mentioned earlier, this author was sent as a lawyer to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in February 1972 at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers of the OIC. He met with Secretary General Tengku Abdul Rahman and asked King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz to mention the issue in his speech. King Faisal also called Tun Abdul Razak to support the case, which Malaysia did. Minister Buoyaser of Libya coordinated with the Moros and got the Bangsa Moro issue into the agenda for the next conference in Libya. That was how the Bangsa Moro issue became the concern of the OIC from 1972 to the present, 29 years and still not finally settled. When martial law was declared, the
author was arrested and detained at Fort Bonifacio. In 1976, he went into exile in Saudi Arabia until 1987, after EDSA I upon invitation of the government under President Corazon C. Aquino. In 1972, the Bangsa Moro clans led the fight against the military that were sent to the Moro areas to collect loose firearms which started with the October uprising in Marawi in 1972. Later in 1973, the MNLF gradually took over the leadership of the armed struggle because of the weapons they were able to bring into Mindanao and logistics donated by supporters of the Bangsa Moro JIHAD. The OIC and many Islamic organizations and governments gave political and material support to the Bangsa Moro. The OIC Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Somalia and Senegal came to the Philippines in 1973 and met with the President and agreed to work out a political solution. They went to the Muslim areas up to Sulu. In 1974, the burning of Jolo resulted when the MNLF fighters entered Jolo and a very big battle raged with naval bombardment ordered against Jolo in disregard for innocent civilian lives.
As a consequence, the 1974 Islamic Summit was held in Islamabad, Pakistan. The Summit declared that the situation of the Bangsa Moro Muslims was not an internal problem but a concern of the whole Muslim world. This was demanded by the Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak. The Bangsa Moro was allowed to convene in Marawi City by President Marcos. The Confederation of the Royal Houses of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan led by its Chairman, Sultan Harun Al Rashid Lucman and this author as the Supervising Officer of the Presidential Task Force for the Reconstruction and Development of Mindanao, held the "Mindanao Policy Conference" and came out with a resolution demanding regional political autonomy. This was at the height of martial law and it became the political basis for the OIC to demand regional political autonomy and the demand for negotiations with the Bangsa Moro leaders and the MNLF at the 1974 Kuala Lumpur Conference of OIC-ICFM. At this time there was only one leadership and organization – the MNLF. The Bangsa Moro struggle got the support of the Muslim states and the first negotiation between MNLF and GRP was in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia hosted by the OIC in 1975. Executive Secretary Alejandro Melchor led the GRP delegation.
NEGOTIATIONS WITH BANGSA MORO
In 1976, the government created a negotiating panel headed by Carmelo Z. Barbero to talk peace again with the MNLF. The talks were held under the auspices of the OIC in Tripoli, Libya. The peace talks resulted in the forging of the now historic Tripoli
Agreement and recognized as the historic territories of the Bangsa Moro Darul Salam of the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, Pat-a Pagampong a Ranao, Rajah Buayan and Saragani or the areas almost corresponding to the Moro Province during the American occupation which is the whole of Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan except the Caraga Region. To end the war, the areas of autonomy consisting of 13 provinces and cities therein were recognized by the GRP as the Bangsa Moro Homeland. These are the areas which were later constituted as the SZOPAD - Special Zone of Peace and Development.
President Marcos held a referendum on the areas of autonomy and reduced the area to 10 provinces and cities and established the Regional Commissions for Regions 9 and 12. The violation of the Tripoli Agreement was from its inception and it was more honored in the breach rather in compliance. In 1977, Hashim Salamat, the MNLF Vice Chairman for Foreign Affairs left the organization and formed as separate faction of the MNLF. After a few years when OIC did not recognize him, Salamat organized the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), emphasizing Islam instead of only political and economic grievance of the Bangsa Moro.
This split was later followed in 1982 when the Moro Peoples National Congress of MNLF led by Atty. Abdul Basit Harrid (Jibril Riddah) and Haji Napis Bidin ousted Chairman Nur Misuari and installed Commander Dimas Pundato as Chairman, supported by many active commanders in the Homeland. Pundato was then Vice-Chairman of Misuari's MNLF. The BMLO and the Pundato faction later joined forces and established the MNLF-Reformist Group. The group disbanded when Pundato joined the government as OMA Chief under President Corazon Aquino. The reformist commanders who did not join the government like Cdr. Digo and Cdr. Iqra formed in 1999, the new MNLF-Islamic Command Council with Mujahab Hashim as Chairman and Cdr. Milham Alam as Chief of Staff. Eventually, the four MNLF factions reunited and approved a constitution in Tripoli, Libya, April 2003. They have not yet elected a Chairman and other officers.
TRIPOLI AGREEMENT 1976
The government implemented the Tripoli Agreement unilaterally in a manner that was in contravention with the letter and spirit of the said Agreement. In 1986, President Marcos was deposed through "People Power" and Corazon C. Aquino ascended to the Presidency. She did not honor fully the Tripoli Agreement according to MNLF,
the only pact, treaty or agreement signed during the Marcos regime that Aquino refused to recognize despite the commitment of Ninoy Aquino, to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement and if autonomy would not work after ten years, he will support the independence of Bangsa Moro. This author was present when this statement was made in 1982 because Sultan Rashid Lucman, General Salipada Pendatun and this author met with King Khalid Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia with Ninoy Aquino at the King's Palace in Taif, Saudi Arabia. We also arranged and gave Ninoy his passport "Marcial Bonifacio" which he filled-up at Sheraton Hotel, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in this author's presence.
The author was able, with exiled Moro leaders in Saudi Arabia like the late Ambassador Mauyag Tamano, to convince the then OIC Secretary General Puzada to send a message to President Aquino recognizing her as the President of the Philippines in March 1, 1986. This was five days after EDSA I and the forty-nine (49) Muslim states were the first to recognize the legality of EDSA I. This fact has never been mentioned in the EDSA I history which is unfortunate because the Bangsa Moro conflict would have been settled much earlier.
President Aquino created a Constitutional Commission (ConCom) that drafted a new constitution for the country. The new constitution contained a provision for the creation of an Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The new constitution was ratified in 1987 and a new Congress was established in the same year. Art. X was the
reason why the MNLF broke-off negotiations with President Aquino and the MNLF did not recognize the Organic Act. The MILF adopted the same position and both boycotted the elections. Majority of the Muslims rejected or boycotted the said Act. It was for this reason that the Act was ratified by only four (4) provinces. The Christians and the Lumad's (culturally indigenous groups) did not reject per se the concept of regional autonomy.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr. sponsored the bill in the Senate- the "Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao" which was signed into law as Republic Act (RA) No. 6734. The MNLF and MILF claimed that it was a betrayal of the Tripoli Agreement, a charge that Senator Pimentel refuted by claiming that the law implemented 99% of the Tripoli
Agreement. President Ramos in 1993 revived negotiations with Chairman Misuari to fully implement the Tripoli Agreement as a binding international obligation and commitment. This was an admission that RA 6734 did not implement fully the Tripoli
Agreement. The Final Peace Agreement (FPA) was signed on September, 1996 between the MNLF/OIC and GRP in Jakarta and finally in Manila.
FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT (FPA) 1996
The FPA provided for the reorganization of the ARMM and the establishment of the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and its Consultative Assembly (CA). The SPCPD was tasked with coordinating development programs and projects for Mindanao but the government failed to provide the necessary funds and support facilities to the SPCPD, the government had allegedly allocated FORTY ONE BILLION PESOS (P41B) but only Eighteen (18B) Billion Pesos had been disbursed according to SPCPD/ARMM officials form 1996-2000. It also did not cooperate with the SPCPD in implementing the development programs and projects for Mindanao.
There was inadequate funding and later in the Senate Hearings the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) admitted that the total releases for ARMM were below P18 Billion under the term of Regional Governor Misuari and most of the funds were for personnel services for the devolved agencies. There was nothing "Final" in the
Agreement because it was subject to the "Will of Congress" and the "Dictates of the Executive."
The creation of the Mindanao Coordinating Council had sidelined the SPCPD (established by E.O. 371), which was created by President Estrada to be the arm of the Office of the President in the planning, recommendation, coordination and monitoring/validating nationally and internationally funded socio-economic projects in the SZOPAD areas. The Chairman of the Consultative Assembly of SPCPD announced that there would be en masse resignations by the ASSEMBLYMEN because the MCC under EO 261, S.2000, and the SPCPD/ARMM were monitoring and validating agencies but were not represented in the council and no Muslim was appointed to the council. This author was invited to address the First Joint Sessions of the ARMM-RLA and the SPCPD-Consultative Assembly on September, 2001 upon the invitation of Chairman Misuari at General Santos City. The creation of the MCC and non-implementation of the FPA and the failure to enact the Organic Act agreed to in the FPA was denounced and the resolution was forwarded to GRP and the OIC Fact Finding Mission of the OIC. Fr. Eliseo Mercado claims that the SPCPD has been rendered virtually inutile as Chairman Nur Misuari has earlier declared. Without the SPCPD then, the FPA should be considered revoked at least by implication because there is no more implementing agency. After the ratification last August 14, 2001 of the Organic Law, then the SPCPD was ipso facto abolished and the SPDA was abolished in 2002.
From 1999 to 2002 the government failed to fully implement the FPA in its substantive provisions as far as MNLF/OIC is concerned (later as evidenced by Resolution No. 02-30, May 30, 2003, 30th ICFM at Tehran, Iran). At the same time the negotiations with the MILF broke down and led to renewed fighting between government
troops and this time, the MILF carried on the Moro armed struggle when the MNLF decided to stop fighting after they signed the FPA and its chairman became then ARMM regional governor and concurrent SPCPD chairman. On the other hand, Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President in 1998 with the support of the MILF and many Islamic organizations because he signed an agreement with Ummah Party of Lanao del Sur to pursue peace and development and appoint a Muslim to the cabinet and other high positions. He also announced that he would establish a Malacanang in the south as well as implement the peace process and the FPA.
AGREEMENT WITH MILF
In August of 1998, the GRP and MILF signed an Interim Agreement to
continue the negotiations started with the GRP under President
Ramos. There was a lot of goodwill because the new AFP chief of
Staff, General Nazareno was even endorsed by MILF and the MILF
supported President Estrada on the week of the elections. The
President knew this, Presidential Adviser for Flagship Projects;
Robert Aventajado even brought the reply of the President to Camp
Abubakar and met with Chairman Hashim Salamat. He later became a
frequent visitor and gave socio-economic projects andinfrastructure
projects to MILF as confidence building measures and entered into
an agreement making the area a zone for peace. The GRP also
entered into agreements with MILF acknowledging the major camps of
the MILF and this was under President Estrada and not under
President Ramos. Everyone was euphoric that peace was at hand and
development and progress will follow as the peace dividends.
Later, the "all-out war" of President Estrada was launched against
the MILF despite the signing of the Aide Memoire between the GRP
and MILF. The rest is history chronicled in blood in Mindanao and
street protests all over the country. It culminated with EDSA II
and the ouster of Estrada.
The new President, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo declared an “all-out
peace†policy and dropped all the charges against Chairman Salamat
and other MILF leaders and started new negotiations. The new all
out war against MILF was again launched by Secretary Angelo Reyes
in February 2002 during the Eidul Adha prayers in the early morning
of February 10, 2003 at the Islamic Center of the Buliok complex at
Pikit, Cotabato after there was already a decision by both the GRP
and MILF to meet at Kuala Lumpur to discuss the peace agreement.
Secretary Eduardo Ermita even said on TV that day that it was â
€œtragic†because of the peace process was going smoothly. The
panels met at Kuala Lumpur for exploratory talks and came up with a
Joint Statement on March 28, 2003. This was after the Davao
International Airport bombing on March 4, 2003. The March 28, 2003
agreement was not implemented because of another bombing on April
4, 2003 at Sasa Port, Davao City. Again Exploratory Talks were held
at Kuala Lumpur and another agreement was made in June 21, 2003.
This was again not implemented because despite the two unilateral
declarations of MILF to stop all offensive military actions on May
28 and June 12, 2003, respectively, the AFP did respond and
military operations against the MILF forces continued.
However, on July 18, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
announced the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement between MILF and
GRP which was finally signed by MILF on July 20, 2003 because
Chairman Al Haj Murad was in the mountain areas at that time,
Chairman Hashim Salamat already died on July 13, 2003 and since
Murad signed the Ceasefire Agreement, it is significant because he
was already the Chairman of the MILF and the GRP signed through
Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Chairman of the GRP panel. The
Coordinating Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) of
GRP-MILF met for the IOTH- CCCH meeting at Cotabato City on August
4, 2003. I was present as a guest being the Secretary General of
the Philippine Muslim Leaders Forum. The CCCH is now operational
and they are working to organize the Local Monitoring Team (LMT's)
to enforce the ceasefire. Malaysia is expected to send observers.
The ceasefire agreement between the GRP and MILF was signed
principally because of the insistence of the Philippine Muslim
Leaders Forum (PMLF) which is the broadest loose associations of
Muslim elected and appointing Muslim officials with the government
to stop military operations and enforce the ceasefire.
In a letter sent to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on July 16,
2003 by PMLF Chairman Deputy Speaker Gerry Salapuddin[2] presented
the situation and urgent need for a ceasefire to restart the peace
talks:
"The MILF officials met with U.S. officials for two hours yesterday
and have discussed the relationship and time-line with the U.S. in
the peace process. They are also coordinating with Malaysia.
After our lengthy discussions, we have agreed that the PMLF will
present to Your Excellency the herein suggestions to break the
impasse. I called Secretary Eduardo Ermita in the presence of the
MILF officials and told him about these suggestions, and he agreed
that this Memorandum be submitted today.
As agreed last June 21, 2003, once the GRP drops the charges and
cancels the warrants and begins the phased redeployment of military
forces in Buliok, which it has started with the return of the
Islamic Center, and the MILF has internally ordered their men at
arms to desist as they have desisted from offensive military
actions, the GRP will Issue a SOMO soonest after June 23, 2003.
Immediately, by June 28, 2003 the Coordinating Committee on the
Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) will be reconvened for the
permanent ceasefire and reactivate the Local Monitoring Teams
(LMTs). The GRP CCCH Chairman shall be headed by a General from the
AFP. The meeting was supposed to be held on June 28, 2003 in
Estosan Hotel, Cotabato. Arrangements were to be made by Secretary
Norberto Gonzales but the meeting did not push through because Sec.
Gonzales left for Europe. He rescheduled it for July 12, 2003 but
he GRP panel was informed late and therefore asked for
postponement. It was rescheduled to July 18, 2003 but Malaysia is
still waiting for the settlement of the Issue on the warrants of
arrest and the MILF is also waiting for the SOMO of the GRP.
In view of these developments, we agreed to propose that the
meeting be held immediately between the GRP and the MILF wherein
both parties will simultaneously declare the effectivity of the
ceasefire agreement of June 21, 2003, convene the CCCH, and
reactivate the LMTs.
The Malaysians will now be requested to send the international
monitoring teams to monitor the ceasefire in coordination with the
CCCH and the LMTs.
As provided in the GRP-MILF joint communique of May 6, 2003 signed
in Malaysia, "the MILF and GRP shall from an Ad-Hoc Joint Action
Group against criminal elements in order to pursue and apprehend
such criminal elements." Furthermore, the Ad-Hoc Joint Action Group
"will operate in tandem with their respective Coordinating
Committees on the Cessation of Hostilities."
The U.S. can now be requested to contribute funds for the
operation of the CCCH and the LMTs as well as discuss with the
GRP-MILF the areas or projects where the U.S. can contribute the
funds as offered."[3]
Again, in the Memorandum sent by the author to Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on GRP and MILF Negotiations dated July 17, 2003, where he
amplified in the Memorandum of Deputy Speaker for Mindanao Gerry
Salapudin and discussed the Minutes of the March 28, 2003 Joint
Statement and the June 21, 2003 GRP-MILF understanding and the
letter of US President Bush to Chairman Salamat, he stated that:
"The Joint Statement of March 28, 2003 between the GRP and the MILF
agreed on the following points:
1. Both parties reiterate their commitment to achieve a
comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the
conflict in Mindanao and resolve to undertake appropriate steps to
pave the way for the resumption of the formal GRP-MILF peace
negotiations;
2. Both parties reaffirm to implement effectively on the ground
all past and existing GRP-MILF agreements. Details of
implementation shall be discussed by the Panels;
Both parties agree to exercise mutual restraint to minimize, if
not put an end to, violence in Mindanao;
To normalize the situation and facilitate the early return of
evacuees to their places of origin and allow rehabilitation to
proceed, a new arrangement on the ground will be forged by both
parties;
The Philippine government takes note of the activation of the
Bangsamoro Development Agency;
Both parties agree to direct their respective Technical Committees
to work on the Implementing Guidelines of the Joint Communiqué
signed on May 6, 2002 to ensure that the peace process is not
adversely affected by the presence of criminal groups in Mindanao.
The Technical Committees will meet within two (2) weeks from today;
The parties agree to improve the existing mechanism for monitoring
of the cessation of hostilities including the composition of an
observer/monitoring groups as provided for in the Implementing
Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement on Peace
of 2001;
The parties reaffirm the provision on the grant of Safety and
Security Guarantees to MILF leaders and members who are directly
and principally involved in the GRP-MILF peace talks; and
Both parties express their gratitude for the gracious hospitality
of the Government of Malaysia in hosting and facilitating the
exploratory talks and for continuing its support to the peace
process."[4]
Under item no. 1, the phrase "resolved to undertake steps" means
the GRP agreed to undertake appropriate steps to cover the
withdrawal of AFP troops from Buliok Complex and recalls of
warrants of arrest issued against all MILF leaders and members.
The pull out and recalls will be conducted within 4 weeks from
today. While the term "resumption" means formal negotiation will
be back on track but Malaysia has to be consulted as agreed by both
parties. This item was again reiterated on June 21, 2003 between
the GRP and the MILF under item no. 3(b), "In response to this
positive development, the GRP has agreed to undertake the
following:
Facilitate the judicial process, in coordination with the
Department of Justice, leading to the lifting of the Warrants of
Arrests filed against MILF leaders and the Reward bounties for the
apprehension of certain MILF leaders;
Begin the process leading to the phased redeployment of military
forces from the Buliok Complex"[5]
It is very clear that the commitment to recall the Warrant of
Arrests against all MILF leaders should have been done within four
weeks from March 28, 2003 which was April 28, 2003 by the GRP. In
the June 21, 2003 Understanding mention again was made to
facilitate the judicial process with the DOJ to lift such warrants
and cancel the bounties. In the understanding of June 16, 2003
between the GRP and the MILF, the lifting of warrants and bounties
was an obligation of the GRP which they will consult with the
principal and the GRP agreed to these points. GRP has partially
withdrawn from Buliok Complex and returned the Islamic Center to
Datu Abbas Pendatun, Sanggunian Member of North Cotabato.
4. In the June 21, 2003 understanding, the GRP stated that "The
June 20, 2003 MILF Statement entitled "Policy Statement of MILF
Chair Salamat Hashim Rejecting Terror as a Means to Resolve
Differences" substantially responds to the need for the MILF to
publicly condemn terrorism and terrorist organizations."[6] The
GRP acceptance should have led to the GRP issuances of SOMO at the
soonest possible time immediately after June 23, 2003. A meeting of
the CCCH was scheduled on June 28, 2003 at Estosan, Cotabato City
to be coordinated by Sec. Gonzales and Atty. Ali. The purpose was
to re-establish the ceasefire under the agreement of June 2001 and
reactivated the LMT's. The Malaysian Monitoring Team will be
fielded to monitor the ceasefire all over the areas of conflict.
The GRP has already requested Malaysia.
6. In the understanding of June 21, 2003, On the issue of Chairman
Salamat's presence during the peace negotiations, the MILF noted
that Chairman Salamat has made known his intention to be present
during the finalization of the GRP-MILF Peace Agreement and on the
actual signing of the said Agreement.
The GRP, noting that Chairman Salamat's presence would be much
preferred during the talks, will request for Chairman Salamat's
presence during the Opening Ceremony for the resumption of formal
talks.[7] The MILF Panel informed the PMLF in our talks last June
15, 2003 that Chairman Salamat has agreed to be present in the
Opening Ceremony as confirmed to you in the memo of the PMLF.
7. Going back to the May 20, 2003 letter of Chairman Salamat to
President Bush, this was actually the 2nd letter. The 1st letter
(January 20, 2003) was a reply to US Ambassador Riciardone when he
spoke before the FCAP when he raised the questions: "The US
Government's desire to know What the MILF want or how its (the
problem) going to be resolved". The MILF said "We take this
opportunity to inform Your Excellency that the MILF is a national
liberation organization, with leadership supported by the Bangsa
Moro People, and with legitimate political goal to pursue the right
of the Moro nation to determine their future and political status.
As part of this process, we have an on-going negotiation with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to arrive at a
negotiated political settlement of the Mindanao conflict and the
Bangsa Moro problem, through the mediation and tender of good
offices of the Government of Malaysia."[8]
8. It is this letter that was answered by the Joint Statement of US
President and Arroyo on May 19, 2003 and the speech of Deputy
Secretary of State Richard Armitage explaining the new US Policy
which was accepted by MILF of their May 20, 2003 letter. The US
President instructed Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly to
reply on June 18, 2003 to the letter of Chairman Salamat dated May
20, 2003. This letter was hand carried by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Mathew Dailey and met with the MILF officials.
The basic points of the letter are:
-The United States Government is committed to the territorial
integrity of the Philippines.
-The United States recognizes that the Muslims of the southern
Philippines have serious, legitimate grievances that must be
addressed.
-The United States wishes to see an end to the violence in the
southern Philippines and is working to assist the Republic of the
Philippines in addressing the root causes of that violence.
-The United States is concerned about the links between the MILF
and international terrorist organizations and asks that those links
be severed immediately.
-The United States stands ready to support, both politically and
financially, a bon fide peace process between the Republic of the
Philippines and the MILF.
-The United States appreciates the notable work that the Government
of Malaysia has performed in this connection over the last two
years, and will not seek to supplant Kuala Lumpur; indeed, we week
to work with the Malaysians for a successful peace settlement.
-The United States Government will not mediate between the
Government of the Philippines, nor will it participate in the
negotiations directly. We have asked the United States Institute
of Peace, a respected conflict-resolution organization, to
encourage the negotiation process in coordination with the
Government of Malaysia. The USIP is ready to begin this task as
soon as we have a clear signal from you as to your readiness to
follow through."[9]
This declaration of the US government addressed to the leader of a
revolutionary organizations is a "First" for the US and World
Affairs and also a "First" for the Bangsamoro Movement because MNLF
Chairman Nur Misuari never received such a communication from the
US President, particularly at this time when the United States has
emerged as the only super power in the world. This policy
statement of the US President must be seriously considered by the
GRP because of the proposed implications not only in the
Philippines or Mindanao or the Asian but in the whole Muslim world.
The US offer of political and financial assistance to a bona fide
peace process be properly accepted and understood.[10]
It is a rebuff to the peace process because it is considered by the
United States as not bona fide or in bad faith. Both parties must
seriously evaluate their actions to restore confidence to the peace
process.
9. The assignment of the US government of the US Institute of Peace
(USIP) is a direct involvement of the US government because the
USIP is a Federal Institution funded by the US government since
1984 with the Congressional mandate and the Board of Directors are
all appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate just
like the members of the US Supreme Court. They have already
scheduled meeting with MILF and plan exchange of missions.
10. It is imperative that the GRP and MILF must implement their
agreements which are binding international obligations of both
parties mediated by Malaysia in March 28, 2003 and June 21, 2003
particularly convening the meeting of the CCCH and simultaneously
declare the resumption of the ceasefire under the agreement of 2001
and cancel all the warrants of arrests and bounties against all the
accused MILF. This is also the suggestion of the US as well as
Malaysia and other OIC countries in support of the appeal of
churches and other religious groups and civil society. The
conclusion of the US letter to Chairman Salamat clearly manifests
the US concern for a peaceful political settlement:
"I note with satisfaction that the MILF has declared a temporary
ceasefire, which I urge you to extend until a settlement is
concluded. Both sides need to refrain from actions that merely
perpetuate the cycle of violence. Neither side can win this
conflict on the battlefield; however, both the MILF and the
Republic of the Philippines can achieve a lasting victory for the
people of Mindanao by coming to a settlement."[11]
The two Memoranda played a vital role in convincing President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to declare the ceasefire on July 18, 2003,
five (5) days after the death of Chairman Hashim Salamat which was
only confirmed on August 4, 2003 during the resumption of the
meetings of the CCCH to re-establish the ceasefire.
-------END OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
-------
SUPladong REMOntado? SUPer REvolutionary MOro? Ano kaya ang tunay
na kahulugan nito? E-2-2-LOY
ALSO:
-------START OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
Bangsa Moro Conflict: Historical Antecedents and Present Impact
Posted on April 17, 2007.
Filed under: Bangsa Moro, History, Mindanao, Moroland, Socio-
Political | Tags: Abu Sayyaf, Bangsa Moro, historical roots, Islam,
MILF, Mindanao, Philippines |
In September 2000, I was invited to deliver a speech/lecture on the
Social Impact of the Moro Conflict at the University of the
Philippines in Los Banos. Later, I uploaded the speech in my
website and in one web forum I joined. Later, I found out that this
speech has been linked and/or re-published in various websites and
web fora. Some of the cited links do not exist anymore. At any
rate, here it is:
**********************************
A few years ago, I visited my girl friend's house. Her
septuagenarian Visayan grandmother was visiting them at the time.
Upon seeing me, the grandmother fled the room. She knew that her
granddaughter was going out with a Moro. But meeting a Moro in
person seemed to be too unnerving for the old lady. She is not an
illiterate barrio folk. She is a retired schoolteacher, her nephew
(i.e., her brother's son) is a governor and all her children are
degree-holders, two of them are lawyers.
I had a sexagenarian office mate who told me that when he was
growing up in Bicol, the kids' parents usually scare the children
off by shouting "the Moros are coming!" That announcement usually
made the kids run immediately to their houses for safety.
These two anecdotal samples illustrate the social impact of the
Mindanao conflict “ not of the present MILF/Abu Sayyaf crisis nor
of the MNLF wars in the 1970s. These were the effects on the
intermittent warfare between the Moros and the Spanish from the
16th to the 19th century. Although the Spanish have gone for more
than a hundred years now, the effects on the collective psyche of
the Filipinos remain.
The social impact of the present Mindanao conflict will simply be a
reiteration or reinforcement of the impact of the Moro conflict
since the arrival of the Spanish to these Islands. The social
impact of the Mindanao Conflict today is more or less the same as
the social impact of the late 60s to early 70s conflict between the
AFP-supported Christian vigilante groups led by the notorious
Ilagas and the various Moro private armies like the Baracudas,
Blackshirts, PUSA, etc. The social impact of today's Mindanao
conflict is more or less the same as that of the MNLF wars in the
˜70s. And for some of the parties concerned, the social impact of
the present Mindanao conflict is the same as that of the Moro Wars
during the American and Spanish eras. When it comes to Mindanao,
some things never change. There are of course variations, relating
to present conditions.
Perhaps what is needed now is to truly understand the Moro Problem,
from the viewpoint of the Moros. And only a thorough understanding
of history can give light to this issue. However, the Filipino
majority is reluctant to talk about history. They always claim that
the past should be buried and that everyone should be forward-
looking. During every crisis in Mindanao, the Christian Filipino
talk, write and generally disseminate their ideas on supposed
causes of the conflict and give various solutions to the conflict
greater access to education, more infrastructures, coddling Moro
leaders, peace negotiations, etc.
The Moros who call everyone's attention to historical past are
called obscurantists, obstructionists or simply rabble-rousers. But
the adage "he who forgets his past is sure to repeat it" cannot be
truer when applied to the so-called Moro Problem. No solution can
be found if the underlying causes are not considered. The Moros,
unlike the Christianized Filipinos, have a living culture, or as
the French say, culture vivant. This culture is steeped in history.
For example, the greatness of a man is not measured by how much
money he has in the bank, but for the most part, his bloodline
i.e., who his father, mother, grandparents and ancestors were.
Former US President John Quincy Adams in his defense of the Amistad
African prisoners declared that "Who we are is who we were." For
the Moros, that statement is almost sacrosanct.
THE MYTHS ABOUT MORO-PHILIPPINE HISTORY
The Filipinos as ONE nation since time immemorial
It must be emphasized and acknowledged that the Moros and the
Indios (the Christianized Filipinos) never constituted a nation and
that it was only in 1946, upon the proclamation of the Philippine
Republic that the Moros and the Indios became part of one nation-
state.
The World Maps
The earliest world map that included “the Philippines†is on
display at the Malacanang Museum. But lo and behold, the
Philippines was not on the map, only Mindanao and Palawan were
there. It is proof positive that before the Western world ever
heard of the Philippines, they already knew Mindanao and Palawan.
In a 1716 map, a group of Islands was labeled I. Philippinae
(Philippine Islands, plural) But Mindanao Island was also labeled.
This could be construed as indicating that Mindanao Island was not
part of the Philippine Islands. In an 18th European century map,
North Borneo was labeled as "Territories belonging to the Sultan of
Sulu."
The Myth of the Spanish Conquest of Moroland
The Christian majority in the country propagates the myth that
although the Moros fought, they were nevertheless conquered by the
Spaniards. History books call the Moro wars as rebellions that were
answered by Spanish punitive expeditions.
Going back to history, a look at the views of the other Europeans
would give a more objective conclusion. Let us see what the
Europeans themselves thought. The 14th Dutch governor of Moluccas,
Simon Cos, brushed away Spanish claims on Mindanao arguing that if
such claims were based on raiding villages, then the Maguindanaons
had much more territory to claim than the Spaniards. On May 16,
1658, Gov. Cos wrote to his superiors:
"The Muslims have the Spanish settlements burning and
blazing every year and take some 500 captives per raid, while the
Spaniards got only one Maguindanao last year."
When the French led by Admiral Cecille blockaded Basilan in 1845,
the Spanish governor protested alleging that Basilan had recognized
Spain's sovereignty just the year before, in February 1844. (This
alone is telling. This means that after almost 200 years in the
Philippines, the Spanish admitted that Basilan was still not under
their control.) The French answer was to force the Basilan datus to
sign a document affirming the "absolute independence of Basilan
vis-a-vis Spain" on January 13, 1845 aboard the steamer Archimede.
And on February 20, 1845, France forced the Sulu Sultan to formally
cede Basilan Island to France in exchange for 100,000 piastres or
500,000 French francs. The French Admiral totally ignored Spanish
protests. However, the French King, Louis Philippe decided against
taking Basilan although the French Cabinet already approved the
annexation, even allocating the budget for Basilan for that year.
In fact, France has more right than Spain to claim Basilan since
they got a formal cession from the Sultan of Sulu as well as formal
written agreement from the Basilan datus.
In answer to Spanish claims that the Moros were mere pirates, the
British Earl of Denby's instruction to Consul Palgrave on Aug. 25,
1877 stated:
"Her Majesty's government has never regarded the Sultan of
Sulu as a pirate; they never admitted the claim of Spain to
sovereignty over the archipelago;and in the interests of British
trade, they never have been disposed to regard with favor any
extension of Spanish authority or influence in the Sulu waters".
And what did the Spanish themselves think? In a letter by Spanish
Captain-General Marquma to the King of Spain in the late 18th
century, he wrote:
"From this time…these Moros have not ceased to infest our
colonies. Innumerable are the Indios they have captured, the
ranches they have destroyed and the vessels they have taken. It
seems as if God has preserved them for vengeance on the Spanish
that they have not been able to subject them in in 200years in
spite of the expeditions sent against them, the armaments spent
every year to pursue them. In a very little while, we conquered the
islands of the Philippines, but the little islands of Sulu, parts
of Mindanao and other islands nearby, we have not been able to
subjugate to this very day."
Scanning through the various Spanish reports and other official
documents ”bandos y circulares, cartas, cedularios, memorias, etc.“
one could see the pain and destruction suffered by the Spanish
masters and their Indio subjects at the hands of the Moros. The
Moros regularly raided Spanish settlements in Luzon, Visayas and
Mindanao. The report of Spanish Governor-General Manuel de Arandia
to the King of Spain dated May 24, 1755 enumerated the losses
suffered by the Spanish from the Moros, who attacked with impunity
most of the Spanish settlements in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao
which brought the Islands practically to its knees ("en el
deplorable estado y fatal sistema").
Even the Americans belittled Spanish claims in Mindanao. In his
Foreword to his book, Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros,
Vic Hurley wrote:
"The close of the unsuccessful Spanish conquest of Moroland
marked the beginning of the end of one of the most remarkable
resistance in the annals of military history. The Moslems has
staged a bitter and uninterrupted warfare against the might of
Spain for a period of 377 years. It is doubtful if this record has
been equaled in the whole bloody history of military aggression.
The Dons, accustomed to the easy conquests of Peru and Mexico, met
their match and more in the jungles of Mindanao."
Historical records show that the Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan were
never conquered by Spain and therefore the Treaty of Paris in 1898
was void ab initio with regards to Mindanao. The US had no right to
take over Moroland, except through the law of Conquest.
The Myth of Socio-Economic-Political Backwardness
The Filipino also insist that it was Spain that brought
civilization to the Philippines. The former President Fidel Ramos
once declared that before the coming of Spain, the natives of the
country had nothing but a crude political system known as
barangays. The political and economic systems of the sultanates
were certainly more complex than the Indios' barangay systems. The
Dutch anthropologist Ruurdje Laarhoven has this to say about the
Maguindanao sultanate in the 17th century:
"The Maguindanao rulers must be credited for their astuteness
in utilizing their strategic position between the Spanish-
controlled Philippines and the Dutch-controlled Moluccas. They were
able to mobilize the rivalry of these European powers to neutralize
each other while successfully maintaining its independence and
advancing its own political development. Even factional struggles
within the Mindanao confederacy can be seen positively as
indicators of political evolution towards a supra-tribal state able
to harness all human and ecological resources within its territory
for higher political goals, able to operate as a state in a larger
political arena defined by the presence of other state-organized
powers such as the Dutch, English and Spanish operating in
Southeast Asia." (Laarhoven : 1989, p. 181)
James F. Warren, in his book, The Sulu Zone, wrote:
"The source of Sulu's hegemony after 1768 was its role as a
regional emporium in the commerce between European traders,
southeast Asian realms and China. The increasing magnitude of this
external trade made regional distribution the dominant pattern of
the economy of the Tausug state and established itsascendancy in
the region."
The Sultanates of Maguindanao, Sulu and Buayan entered into several
treaties with European powers like Netherlands, England and even
Spain. European powers never entered into treaties with barangay
datus. Blood compact was the preferred mode of the Europeans when
negotiating with barangay chieftains.
The Filipino people were united in their desire for Independence
from the US.
During the American Occupation, the great majority of the Moros
fought for independence through peaceful and even violent means.
And they repeatedly communicated their desire for Independence. And
if they could not have Independence, they would rather be with the
Americans than with the Filipinos. The Wood-Forbes Commission
Report of 1922 stated:
"The Moros are a unit against independence and are united
for continuance of American control and, in case of separation of
the Philippines from the US, desire their portion of the Islands to
be retained as American territory under American control. The
pagans and non-Christians, constituting 10% of the population, are
for continued American control. They want peace and security, These
the Americans have given them."
Countering Filipino propaganda that the Americans simply wanted to
grab the lands of the Moros, Datu Gumbay Piang of Buayan declared
in a speech in 1926 that the Moros "would be between two fearful
and objectionable daggers: American at the one side and Filipino at
the other. As a defenseless people they would have no alternative
but choose which dagger would be less injurious. And, funny to say,
they have already, since long ago, chosen the American dagger."
With the intensified fight for Philippine Independence led by
Manuel L. Quezon, the Moros sent various petitions to the US
President and the US Congress. On June 9, 1921, the Moros of Sulu
sent a petition to the US government which stated:
"We are independent for 500 years. Even Spain failed to
conquer us. If the U.S. quits the Philippines, and the Filipinos
attempt to govern us, we will fight."
On February 4, 1924, another petition to the US Congress was signed
by more than 100 datus led the Maguindanao Sultan Mangigin. The
petition in part reads:
"In the event that the United States grant independence to
the Philippine Islands without provision for our retention under
the American flag, it is our firm intention and resolve to declare
ourselves an independent Constitutional sultanate to be known to
the world as Moro Nation."
The Moros found sympathetic ears in the US Congress. On May 6,
1926, Congressman Robert L. Bacon of New York gave a stirring
speech in support of the Moros. He said:
"Their (the Moros') so-called representation in the
Philippine Legislature is a farce and a mockery. They are
deliberately denied any share or participation in the government.
They have no elective representatives…They have no magistrates,
no judges, no public prosecutor drawn from their own people. And
the guardians of law and order in their region “constabulary“ are
practically drawn from the ranks of their hereditary enemies “the
Filipinos." The Filipinos are their lawmakers, their governors,
their judges, their persecutors and their policemen. To these
conditions the Moros respond by giving nothing but hate and
unwilling submission."
Some 75 years later, and the Moros find themselves still with no
representation in the Senate, very few judges, and the guardians of
law and public order “the military and police“ are still
practically drawn from the ranks of the Filipinos. Congressman
Bacon added:
"The Philippine Islands are divided into two very distinct
areas “the Christian provinces and the Mohammedan territory".These
two regions belong to different and opposed civilizations “the
Christian world and Islam."
Congressman Bacon sponsored a bill that would retain Mindanao and
Sulu in the event of Philippine independence. Other similar bills,
the Roger, Cooper and Kies bills, were also deliberated in the US
Congress.
During the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, 189
ranking Maranao datus sent an appeal to the US Government through
the Governor-General that stated:
"With regard to the forthcoming Philippine independence, we
foresee that the condition will be characterized by unrest,
suffering and misery"
One more discriminatory act of our Christian Filipino
Associates is shown in the recent constitution of the Philippine
Commonwealth. In that constitution, no provision whatsoever is made
that would operate for the welfare of the Moros, the (provision of
the) constitution are all for the welfare of the Christian
Filipinos and nothing for the Moros. As proof of this, our delegate
did not sign the constitution.
We do not want to be included in the Philippine
Independence (for) once an independent Philippines is launched
there will be trouble between us and the Christian Filipinos
because from time immemorial these two peoples have not lived
harmoniously. It is not proper for two antagonizing peoples live
together under Philippine Independence.
The Dansalan Declaration, as it came to be known went on to say
that the Maranaos would rather "drown in the lake" than be included
in the Philippine Independence.
The Honeymoon Years
Unfortunately for the Moros, World War II came about. When the US
granted Philippine independence after the war, the Moros neither
had the resources nor inclination to fight another war. Thus the
"honeymoon" with the Philippine Republic began, with very few
troubles like the Kamlon rebellion.
But in 1969, with the discovery of the Jabidah massacre, the Moros
realized that the honeymoon was over. From then on, up to the
present, the Moro fight continues.
The Present Conflict
It must be very clear to everyone that the Moro conflict today did
not begin in 1969. It did not begin with Misuari, Salamat or Abbas,
Jr. In 1969, they were the Young Turks but the independence
movement was led by the elders Congressman Lucman, Senator Pendatun
and other Moro leaders.
In 1972, President. Marcos told OIC officials that the Moros were
not united and could never unite, that Maranaos hate Maguindanaos
and both hate the Tausugs, etc., and that the Nationalistas would
not sit with a Liberal, etc.
The OIC then challenged the Moro community to refute Mr. Marcos’s
allegation. Thus was born the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (IDP). The founding directors included Maranao, Tausug,
Maguindanao, Nationalista and Liberal Party leaders. For the first
time political rivals Lucman and Dimaporo, Sinsuat and Pendatun,
and other Moro leaders like Anni, Abubakar, Sen, Tamano, Sen.
Alonto and a host of others including the Young Turks Abbas, Jr.,
Misuari and Salamat joined together in one organization to prove to
the Islamic countries that the Moros were united. The founding
chair of IDP was Dr. C. Adib Majul, then the Dean of the UP College
of Arts and Sciences. Abbas, Jr. was the Secretary-General.
The present conflict in Mindanao does not pertain to only the MILF
and the Abu Sayyaf, although they are the only ones fighting now.
The MNLF cadres are still very much there. The Islamic Command
Council is newly-formed but composed of former MNLF commanders. The
MNLF-Reformists can regroup anytime. There are still thousands of
armed Moros simply waiting for the most opportune time.
An all-out war against the MILF is indeed ill-advised because the
repercussions might be far worse. An all-out war between the AFP
and the MILF will surely expand to an all-out war between the AFP
and all Moro armed groups, which could very well escalate into a
full-scale civil war between the Moros and the Indios.
Time for Peace
Wars will only bring more wars. The Bangsa Moro enjoys the
inalienable right of self-determination. The 1966 Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights of the United Nations states:
"All peoples have the right of self-determination. By
virtue of that right they freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
It is high time that the Bangsa Moro be asked on what it really
wants. Does it want to remain in the present set-up? Do the Moros
prefer an autonomous region within the Republic? Do they want a
federal form of government? Or do they want independence? A clean
and honest referendum can give the answer, and everyone should
abide by the outcome.
Social Impact of the Present Conflict
The present conflict has already shown the negative impacts on the
communities. The degree of intolerance by both communities towards
each other has dramatically increased. The popularity of an â
€œall-out war†policy among the Christian population is evident as
shown by the surge in the popularity rating of President Estrada.
A more serious effect is the apparent success of the Abu Sayyaf and
the apparent failure of the MILF. This means that more Moros would
now be inclined to go the way of terrorism instead of a semi-
conventional warfare as practiced by the MILF.
But there are interesting effects, too. Many Christian
intellectuals are now seeing the practicality in Moro separatism.
More Moro wars would create greater havoc on the economy of the
whole country. Dan Mariano, Executive Editor of the Philippine Post
wrote in his column of May 13, 2000 the ff.:
If only they would be honest about it, the ordinary
Filipinos ”the so-called Christians” feel little kinship and
affinity for those whom they perfunctorily refer to as "Muslim
brothers." There is a great deal of discrimination and prejudice
against the Moros that is expressed officially, as in the
disenfranchisement of entire Muslim communities from the body
politic, and unofficially, as in chauvinistic jokes that portray
Moros as crude, opportunistic yokels.
The Moros are a people that have been set apart from the
Filipino nation by history, faith and culture. Their integration
into the Philippine Republic was a fabrication of colonialism. The
creation of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao merely
acknowledged this fact, but it did not go far enough to rectify a
centuries-old mistake.
The creation of a homeland that the Moros can truly call
their own is the only intelligent solution to the Mindanao problem.
When this comes to pass, only then can Filipinos and Moros learn to
live in peace — as good neighbors.
================================================================
Speech delivered by Datu Jamal Ashley Abbas at the University of
the Philippines in Los Banos on 5 Sept. 2000
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
BLAIR, EMMA HELEN and James Robertson (eds.) The Philippine
Islands, 1493-1898 , Cleveland: 1904
DERY, LUIS CAMARA The Kris in Philippine History: A Study of the
Impact of Anti-Colonial Resistance, 1571-1896 self-published : 1997
HURLEY, VIC Swish of the Cross, The Story of the Moros, E.P. Dutton
& Co., USA: 1936
GEORGE, T.J.S. Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine
Politics, Oxford Univ. Press, Kuala Lumpur: 1980
GOWING, PETER G. Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of
Muslim Filipinos 1899-1920, UP Press, Q.C.: 1977
JUBAIR, SALAH A Nation Under Endless Tyranny, 2nd ed., Lahore: 1997
LAARHOVEN, RUURDJE Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, The Maguindanao
Sultanate in the 17th Century, New Day, Q.C.: 1989
MAJUL, CESAR ADIB Muslims in the Philippines, 3rd edition, UP
Press, Q.C.: 1999
MAN, CHE W. K. Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines
and the Malays of Southern Thailand, Ateneo de Manila Press, Q.C.:
1990
NARDIN, DENIS France and the Philippines: From the Beginning to the
End of the Spanish Regime, translated by Ma. Theresa Cruz, National
Historical Institute: 1989
PIGAFETTA, ANTONIO Magellan's Voyage Around The World, 1906 edition
RASUL, JAINAL D. The Philippine Muslims: Struggle for Identity,
Nueva Press, Manila: 1970
SALEEBY, NAJEEB MITRY Studies in Moro History, Law and Religion,
Manila: 1905
TAN, SAMUEL K. The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle 1900-1972,
Filipinas Foundation, Q.C. 1977
THOMAS, RALPH Muslim But Filipino: The Integration of Philippine
Muslims, 1917-1946, PhD dissertation GSAS, Univ. of Pennsylvania:
1971
-------END OF COPIED ARTICLE-------
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)